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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Associated Press, July 16, 1999:
WASHINGTON (AP)-UNIFORM VOTING ACT SIGNED INTO LAW BY
PRESIDENT CLINTON. As expected, President Clinton signed the Uniform
Voting Act this morning. After some haggling in both the House and Senate
over details of the bill, the UV A was sent to the President. The bill introduced
into Congress by Senator Joseph Liebermann was the result of increasing
pressure from both U.S. citizens and the global community. As a leader in the
world, and the last remaining superpower, many had argued that the U.S. has a
responsibility to ensure that none of its citizens are disenfranchised. Yet prior
to the UV A many had recognized that the United States Government had denied
its citizens living overseas, the right to vote. Thus, the UV A was passed:

To protect against the further disenfranchisement of minorities and to
ensure that all citizens of the United States, irrespective of their residency
in a state, shall have the right to vote in Presidential elections, and national
referendums. These citizens are to include the U.S. citizens living in
territories such as Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and
Micronesia. Henceforth these territories are to be given electoral votes in
the same manner that states receive electoral votes.
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Both the overseas citizens of the United States and the World Community
applaud the United States legislation as a shining example of inclusion and
concern for citizens that have historically been marginalized. 1

The Associated Press, November 8, 2000:
WASHINGTON (AP)-ELECTION STILL UNDECIDED. All eyes have
turned to Florida and the United States overseas votes to determine the election.
Florida's results have not been forthcoming because of the close election results
in that state. Furthermore, the territories of the United States, having just been
given the right to vote in Presidential elections, are having trouble counting the
votes and submitting the results on time. Governor Bush trails Vice President
Gore with 246 electoral votes and 266 electoral votes respectively. The 25
electoral votes from Florida could decide the next election. Furthermore there is
concern in the Bush camp that he may not carry enough of the overseas
territories to win the election. Puerto Rico, the largest of the overseas
possession, nearly 4 million strong, weighs in with 8 electoral votes. The other
statutory citizens in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam and the U.S. Marshall
Islands each receive 3 electoral votes.2

The Associated Press, November 10, 2000:
WASHINGTON (AP)-AL GoRE WINS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION! With
the election results in from the United States territories Al Gore is declared the
winner of the 2000 Presidential Elections. With Gore taking Puerto Rico, Guam
and the U.S. Marshall Islands, and Bush taking the U.S. Virgin Islands, Gore
has 281 electoral votes to Bush's 249. Even should George Bush take Florida
he would not have enough to defeat Al Gore.3

II. FICTION OR Flm.JRE?
The above fictional press releases are intended to illustrate a little
lmown fact-that millions of United States citizens who reside in the
United States island territories, such as Puerto Rico, do not have
representation in the United States government and cannot decide their fate.
As these reports suggest, for the inhabitants of United States territories,
being a part of the United States does not necessarily mean being a
member of this country's body politic. The above parable is intended to
highlight a controversy concerning the millions of island people living
under the United States flag. Indeed, some of these inhabitants even hold the

1.
2.
3.

This is a fictional press release.
This is a fictional account of the 2000 United States Presidential election.
This is fictional.
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status of United States citizens, yet they cannot vote in national elections
and have no congressional representation. 4
Nonetheless, to most Americans the above statements may appear to
be unbelievable and even whimsical because Americans typically cannot
imagine that any, let alone millions, of United States citizens are denied
key rights. As demonstrated by the recent nonfictional presidential election
controversy concerning the accuracy of the results in the State of Florida,
questions over the vote of a few hundred citizens are significant enough
to hold decisions affecting the entire country in abeyance. Yet, as a
result of the United States' relationship with its island territories and despite
perceptions, millions of United States citizens are disenfranchised and
cannot vote. However, if the very same individuals were residents of
one of the fifty states or for that matter, of a foreign sovereign nation,
they could, as United States citizens, exercise their right to vote. The
individuals who exist in this disenfranchised status are the peoples of the
island groups of Puerto Rico, the American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands,
and Palau. While the bulk of these islands are formally considered United
States territories, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of
Marshall Islands, and Palau have chosen to become autonomous but are
included herein because issues persist concerning their sovereignty. 5
The characterization of the United States as a power that annexes distant
lands and disenfranchises its inhabitants is perhaps troubling because the
American psyche does not associate colonialism with the United States.
And yet, "our nation finds itself referred to as a 'colonial power' despite
its renunciation of such a policy in 1776."6 As historian Arnold Leibowitz
observed, "[t]he United States ... somewhat to its own astonishment,
4. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR?: AND OTIIER
APOCALYPTIC TALES OF AMERICA AFrER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 142
(1996); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT
AMERICA AND RACE 19-21 (1995); George W. Gold, The Racial Prerequisite in the
Naturalization Law, 15 B.U. L. REv. 462 (1935); Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and
the Search for Political Community Among "We the People," 16 OR. L. REv. 233
(1997); Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico
Relations: The Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 121 (1998); Yxta Maya
Murray, The Latino-American Crisis of Citizenship, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 503 (1998);
Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Deconstructing Homo(geneous) Americanus: The White Ethnic
Immigrant Narrative and Its Exclusionary Effect, 12 TuL. L. REV. 1493 (1998).
5. Unlike other works on the subject, such as Jon M.Van Dyke, The Evolving
Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U.
HAW. L. REV. 445 (1992), this Article rejects the United States' authority to "establish
different regimes for these insular communities than those that govern the states." Id. at
448. This Article repudiates any form of colonial subjugation.
6. Patsy T. Mink, Micronesia: Our Bungled Trust, 6 TEX. INT'L L.J. 181, 181
(1971); see also John B. Metelski, Micronesia and Free Association: Can Federalism
Save Them?, 5 CAL. W. INT'LL.J. 162, 165 (1975).
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[is] the [world's] largest overseas territorial power."7 As such, the
disassociation of United States citizens described above is in reality not
far-fetched at all. 8
Despite the allegedly neutral and liberating notions of justice and
equality that are associated with American legal rhetoric, particularly
citizenship law, an examination of America's nineteenth and twentieth
century expansionism reveals that these principles fail to apply to all
persons associated with America.9 Notwithstanding this nation's role in
international movements calling for self-determination of colonized peoples
throughout the world, 10 this country established and has maintained what
can be described as colonies. In an era of self-determination and in the
decade dedicated to the eradication of colonialism, 11 the leader of the
free world and great emancipator of the oppressed has maintained a
colonial regime.
This country has maintained its possessions without a great deal of
opposition. It has fostered the disenfranchised status of these possessions
through the use of certain psychological tools, which will be labeled as:
(1) citizenship status, (2) international status, and (3) economic
dependency and American idealism. These tools have convinced United
States mainland citizens, the international community, and the
conquered that the United States' relationship with the conquered
territorial peoples is not colonial. The United States has persuaded the
conquered and the international community of the conquered' s
membership in the United States body politic by using labels such as
"statutory citizen," and "national." The United States has also found
7. ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 3 (1989); see also Ediberto Roman, Empire
Forgotten: The United States's Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119,
1120-23 (1997) [hereinafter Empire Forgotten].
8. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1202; Ediberto Roman, The Alien-Citizen
Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1998).
9. This Article focuses on what Frantz Fanon reminded us was the reality that the
"'[c]olonial[ist] and imperial[ist] have not paid their score' .... [For this reason,] [w]e
must take stock of the nostalgia for empire, as well as the anger and resentment it
provokes in those who were ruled." EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 12
(1993) (quoting FRANZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 79 (Constance Farrington
trans., 1963)).
10. See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of SelfDetennination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge,
21 VT. L. REV. 225 (1996).
11. Id.
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approval for its fictitious grant of autonomy by using thinly veiled
euphemisms for colony, such as "commonwealth status," "federated
states," and "free association."
The use of economic dependence on United States public or private
investment, which is often coupled with democratic rhetoric in order to
foster a need-based desire for association, also facilitates the continued
control over the territories. 12 These psychological creations or tools, when
combined, have served a dual purpose of convincing the conquered that
they in effect exist in a paradox: they live in a free and autonomous
foreign state and at the same time they are full-fledged citizens or members of
the United States' body politic. These psychological or hegemonic creations
have fostered an anomalous and oxymoronic existence because these peoples
are neither members of the American family, nor are they members of
free and autonomous sovereign nations. 13
III. THE ASPIRATIONS OF LIBERALISM VERSUS THE
REALITY OF EXPANSIONISM

With roots dating back to Greek philosophy, liberalism is largely a
"normative political philosophy [that is premised upon] a set of moral
arguments about the justification of political action and institutions." 14
The recent development of the theory is recognized as stemming from
such writers as John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, Alexis de
Toqueville, Friedrick Von Hayek, and more recently, from writer Ronald
Dworkin. 15 According to Professor Kyrnlicka, two base preconditions
are necessary for the attainment of a good life. 16 The first, is living our
life from the inside in accordance with our beliefs about what gives
value to life; the second, is that we be free to question those beliefs. 17
Because these preconditions are essential and at their root appear to be
premised upon notions of freedom and that which is just, government is

12. In such a dependency setting, the acted upon state, such as Guam, has its
economic infrastructure so penetrated that crucial decision-making power is exercised by
the influencing power, such as the United States.
13. See discussion infra Part V.B.
14.
WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 9 (1989). At least
one author has asserted that liberalism and colonialism developed during the same time
period, stating that "[t]heir contradictions were allowed because the eligibility for socalled universal rights was understood to be conditioned upon one's subjectivity, shaped
by notions ofracial superiority. The subordination produced through this encounter does
not solely implicate what is sought to be redressed through civil rights." Leti Volpp,
Righting Wrongs, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1833 (2000).
15. See Alan Ryan, Liberalism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 291 (Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit eds., 1993).
16. KYMLICKA, supra note 14, at 12-13.
17. Id. at 13.
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to "treat[] people as equals, with equal concern and respect, by providing
for each individual the liberties and resources needed to examine and act
on [those] beliefs. This requirement forms the basis of contemporary
liberal theories of justice." 18 Professor Dworkin observed that notions of
equality and neutrality are at the core of liberalism. He noted:
I argue that the constitutive morality of liberalism "is a theory of equality that
requires official neutrality amongst theories of what is valuable in life....
[Liberalism's] constitutive morality provides that human beings must be treated
as equals by their government, not because there is no right and wrong in
political morality, but because that is what is right. Liberalism does not rest on
any special theory of personality, nor does it deny that most human beings will
think that what is good for them is that they be active in society. Liberalism is
not self-contradictory: the liberal conception of equality is a principle of
political organization that is required by justice, not a way of life for
individuals.19

The precepts of liberal theory have had considerable influence on
American jurisprudence and political philosophy.20 The works of John
Locke have contributed greatly to American notions of justice, particularly in
the areas of citizenship.21 Yet, despite the egalitarian basis of liberal
theory, the apparent American adoption of the theory in its jurisprudence,
American history, particularly with respect to citizenship law, demonstrates a
practice that is anything but egalitarian. In other words, the reality of
American history belies the precepts of its leading theory. 22 An
examination of this country's expansionism throughout the last century,
all too often evidences not equality and liberty, but subordination.23
18. Id.
19. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 441 (1986) (citation omitted).
20. "A fundamental tenet of neoclassical liberalism posits that equality of rights is
necessary to human flourishing. . . . The life of liberalism began in capitalist market
societies and it can only be fully comprehended in terms of the social and economic
institutions that shaped it." Danaya C. Wright, Foreword: Toward a Multicultural
Theory of Property Rights, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 2, 2-3 (2000).
21. See JOHN LoCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CML GOVERNMENT 66 (C. B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690); see also Douglas G. Smith,
Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 681, 696 (1997).
22. Professor Pedro Malavet provides a fine critique of the application of
American liberal theory to the United States citizens of Puerto Rico. See Pedro A.
Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1
(2000).
23. Though liberalism and colonialism may seem to be incompatible with each
other, one author has noted that
universal claims of liberalism were able to justify political exclusions, and this
logic continues to operate in the post-colonial moment. It serves as a basis for
distinguishing Others, whether they be women, gays and lesbians, or ethnic
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In order to situate a discourse that intersects liberalism's egalitarianism
under citizenship law with the actualities of United States expansionist
endeavors, it is necessary to understand colonialism, not only as a historical
phenomenon, but also as a current political and economic reality. 24
Colonialism as a concept, because of its elusive nature, has often escaped
rigorous scholastic examination. Jurgen Osterhammel, however, has
defined it as a "relationship of domination between an indigenous (or
forcibly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders."25 He
describes the relationship as one where the fundamental decisions affecting
the lives of the colonized people are made and determined in a distant
metropolis pursuant to the colonial ruler's interests.26 In such relationships,
the colonizers, because of their self-proclaimed superiority and ordained
mandate to rule, typically reject cultural compromises with the conquered.27
Edward Said defines colonialism as "the implanting of settlements on
distant territory."28 Said observes: "Neither imperialism nor colonialism
is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition."29 They are both "supported
and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that
include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech
domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination." 30
In fact, "the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is
plentiful with words and concepts like 'inferior' or 'subject races."' 31
and religious minorities. When confronted with difference, liberalism spawns
strategies of exclusion based on class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion,
and race.
Ratna Kapur & Tayyab Mahmud, Hegemony, Coercion, and Their Teeth-Gritting
Harmony: A Commelltary on Power, Culture, and Sexuality in Franco's Spain, 5 MICH.
J. RACE& L. 995, 1014 (2000).
24. Writer Joseph Conrad described colonialism in the Heart of Darkness as:
The conquest of the earth, which mostly means the taking it away from those
who have different complexion or slightly flatter noses than ourselves, is not a
pretty thing when you look into it too much. What redeems it is the idea only.
An idea at the back of it, not a sentimental pretense but an idea; and an
unselfish belief in the idea-something you can set up, and bow down before,
and offer a sacrifice to ....
JOSEPH CONRAD, THE HEART OF DARKNESS 10 (Robert Kimbrough ed., W.W. Norton &
Co. 3d ed. 1988) (1902).
25. JURGEN OSTERHAMMEL, COLONIALISM: A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 16 (Shelley
L. Frisch trans., Markus Wiener Publishers 1997) (1997). However, historian Philip
Curtin defined the term more generally when he described it as "domination by people of
another culture." Philip D. Curtin, The Black Experience of Colonialism and
Imperialism, in SLAVERY, COLONIALISM, AND RACISM 17, 23 (Sidney W. Mintz ed.,
1974).
26. OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 25, at 16.
27. See id.
28. SAID, supra note 9, at 9.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Colonialism, as used here, includes the "oppression, humiliation, or
exploitation of indigenous peoples."32 Neocolonialism will be used to
denote indirect domination, usually economic or cultural, of countries
formerly colonies but now arguably politically independent.33
The term colony, which stems from colonialism but is not necessarily
present in every colonial undertaking, is a new political organization
created by invasion and cultural domination. 34 In a colony, rule by the
distant metropolis is evident in that the ruled are dependent on a
geographically remote "mother country" or imperial center, which
claims exclusive rights of possession of said colony.35
As such, in a colonial setting, "[t]he parent state alone ... possesses
[the] international personality and has the capacity to exercise
international rights and duties."36 Nevertheless, the parent state may
bestow upon its colony a degree of internal and possibly even external
autonomy. 37 However, these privileges do not eradicate the colonial
relationship because they are dependent on the will of the parent state. 38
Subsequently, as possessions of the parent state, the inhabitants of
colonies are captive people that are denied the basic human right of selfdetermination.39
32. GEORGE H. NADEL & PERRY CURTIS, IMPERIALISM AND COLONIALISM 3 (1964).
33. "[C]olonialism is not just any relationship between masters and servants, but
one in which an entire society is robbed of its historial line of development, externally
manipulated and transformed according to the needs and interests of the colonial rulers."
OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 25, at 15. Jurgen Osterhammel observes that colonial
settings reject "cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are
convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule." Id. at 17.
34. OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 25, at 15-16.
35. The significance of the metropolis' location is verified by the international
community's definition of colony through the "salt water theory." G.A. Res. 1541, U.N.
GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 106, U.N. Doc. A/14684 (1960). This theory
maintains that a territory and its inhabitants are considered a dependent territory, or
essentially a colony, if a body of saltwater separates it from its ruling country. Id. When
the United Nations' General Assembly adopted Resolution 1541, which defined a
dependent territory as a "territory which is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it," the United Nations
essentially codified the "salt water theory." Id. This definition demonstrated the
international communities' determination that, unlike independent countries, dependent
territories are possessions of the parent country, which have no separate statehood or
sovereignty. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1119-25.
36. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (Robert D. Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. This diametrical situation is best understood in light of imperialism. While
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Imperialism, in tum, is intended to "mean the extension of sovereignty
or control, whether direct or indirect, political or economic, by one
government, nation or society over another together with the ideas
justifying or opposing this process. 40 Imperialism is essentially about
power both as end and means." 41
seemingly similar, some have characterized the concept of colonialism differently from
imperialism in that imperialism is a comprehensive concept which encompasses
colonialism. See SAID, supra note 9, at 9. When analyzing the status of subjugated
peoples, as here, an understanding of imperialism is needed because it presupposes the
will and the ability of an imperial country to determine as ruler the national and
international interests of the colony and the colonizer. This distinction is imperative
since the United States' relationship with its island acquisitions is both colonial and
imperialistic in that it is founded on a cultural and racial superiority which results in the
domination by, and in the interests of, a distant metropolis. And yet, it is the duplicity of
the American Empire and not its colonial nature that distinguishes it from the other
modem imperial powers. The United States' cognizant conquest is hypocritical in light
of its official commitment to the right to self-determination. The pretense is crucial in
that it necessitates the creation of the hegemonic tools that are the center of this Article.
See generally OSTERHAMMEL, supra note 25, at 21; SAID, supra note 9, at 7.
40. Because of space limitations, some forms of imperialism will only be
mentioned in passing. For instance, the "Assyrians, Phoenicians, Ottoman Turks, Huns,
Tartars, the warrior nations of Africa and the New World-to name but a few-have all
created empires through conquest and colonization." NADEL & CURTIS, supra note 32,
at 3.
41. Id. at 1. "Imperialism generally involves the collision of two or more cultures
and a subsequent relationship of unequal exchange between or among them. What
confuses the issue has been the inability of men to analyze their real motives for
territorial or cultural expansion and to separate them from rationalizations devised after
the fact." Id. As will be shown, by the mid-1880s imperialism "was no longer identified
with merely a crude expansionist mood ('jingoism') or displays of brute force and gunboat diplomacy. Connoting power, prestige, dignity, and affluence, 'imperialism' was
invoked by some even as a panacea to cure political, social, and economic ills at home."
Id. at 2.
The eighteenth century saw a sudden, and often violent, upsurge in both acquisition
and changing of colonies. Id. at I 0. England "emerged from the protracted wars of the
mid-century as a world power rivaled only by France in the size and affluence of her
empire." Id. at 10-11. "Since the colonial empires of the nineteenth century were
established at different times and for different reasons any chronological division
between the old and the new must be somewhat arbitrary. Despite many popular
candidates for this claim, no single date marks the beginning of the so-called 'new
imperialism."' Id. at 12. By the end of the nineteenth century, empires had expanded
and developed. "Among the distinctive features of the new empires were a shift in
emphasis, after mid-century, from private to national aspects of colonization, the relative
abundance of capital for overseas investment, and the increasingly bitter agitation against
imperialism itself." Id. at 13. "No longer were colonies treated as the private property
of the Crown .... " Id.
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the new empires was the rise of
aggressive competitors to challenge the imperial ascendancy of Great Britain
and France. While Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch reatained portions of other
former empires, Belgium, in the person of King Leopold II, followed by
Germany and later Italy made successful bids for a place in the colonial sun.
In the Far East the rush for concessions and territories was accelerated by the
appearance of three other belligerent powers-the United States, Russia, and
Japan. In Europe, after 1870, commercial and industrial rivalries, tensions
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Colonialism nonetheless requires something more than the ·mere
conquering and annexing of foreign lands. 42 It also includes a mental
state of both the conqueror and the conquered. Historian D. K. Fieldhouse
elaborated on the necessary mental state for a colonial regime. He noted
that a key "basis of imperial authority [is] the mental attitude of the
colonist."43 His acceptance of subordination-whether through a
positive sense of common interest with the parent state, or through
inability to conceive of any alternative-makes the empire durable. The
durability of the empire is sustained on both sides, that of the rulers and
that of the distant ruled,44 and, in turn, each has a set of interpretations of
their common history with their own perspective, historical sense,
emotions, and traditions.45
arising out of the arms race, the increasingly rigid alliance system, and the
demands of party politics all contributed to the momentum of overseas
expansion. The British empire, furthermore, had a catalytic effect on the
Continent where many political leaders and financiers were anxious to match,
eventually to surpass, the wealth and prestige of "Greater Britain."
Id. at 14-15.
Furthermore the "maturing capitalist economies of Western Europe, above all the
industrial-financial complex in Great Britain, created neeeds [sic] that could apparently
be satisfied only through investment in other parts of the world." Id. at 13. During the
1890s, virtually all the great powers showed signs of imperialist hysteria.
The perverse application of Darwin's theory of natural selection to nations and
societies had created an appropriately amoral environment in which "superior"
peoples could prove their fitness to survive at the expense of "inferiors." The
advent of mass electorates and of cheap, sensational journalism brought large
sections of the working classes into the imperial arena where they could cheer
the subjugation of Ashantis, Hottentots, Dervishes, or Bantu peoples. The
pioneers and proconsuls of the new empires may have had much in common
with the heroes of the old empires. But there was an important difference. In
the late nineteenth century a vast audience derived vicarious pleasure from
following the exploits of these men in newspapers, lecture rooms, and music
halls.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
42. See Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism:
The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225, 285 (1996). In this
impressive work, the author addresses the notion of the conquerer' s "inherent 'right"' to
expand, which is, at least in part, a result of a "perceived 'tradition of expansion,'
developed through a century of an almost continuous practice of territorial enlargement
throughout the continent." Id.
43. SAID, supra note 9, at 11 (citing D. K. FIELDHOUSE, THE COLONIAL EMPIRES: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 103 (1965) (discussing white
colonists in the Americas, although the general point is broader)).
44. Id.
45. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of identities on a global scale. Yet just
as human beings make their own history, they also create their own identities.
Imperialism has the effect of altering the conquered's vision of his or her own identity.
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Thus, any changes to colonial rule cannot occur without the willingness of
men and women to resist the pressures of colonial rule, challenge and
project ideas of liberation, and imagine a new national community.46
Liberating changes will not occur unless ( 1) economic or political
exhaustion with the empire sets in at the home of the ruled, (2) the idea
of empire and the cost of colonial rule are challenged publicly, (3) the
representations of imperialism begin to lose their justification and
legitimacy, and, finally (4) the rebellious "natives" impress upon the
metropolitan culture the independence and integrity of their own culture,
free from colonial encroachment.47
A. The United States Colonial Mandate: The Territorial Clause

With its victory in the Spanish-American War, the United States
entered into the race to become a world colonial power. 48 Yet, in light
Id. In his chapter on "the pitfalls of nationalist consciousness" in The Wretched of the
Earth, Fanon foresaw what appears to be occurring with this country's island
dependencies. See FANON, supra note 9, at 119-64. His notion was that unless national
consciousness at its moment of success was somehow changed into a social
consciousness, the future would hold not liberation but an extension of imperialism. Id.
Fanon's theory is not meant to answer the appeals of a native chafing under the
paternalistic surveillance of a European policeman and, in a sense, preferring the services
of a native office in his place. On the contrary, it first represents colonialism as a
totalizing system nourished in the same way that human behavior is informed by
unconscious desires. Fanon's implicit analogy is devastating.
46. See SAID, supra note 9, at 6-7.
47. See id.
48. In a narrow sense, then, the race for colonies was the product of diplomacy
rather than of any more positive force. Germany set the example by claiming
exclusive control over areas in which she had an arguable commercial stake,
but no more, as a means of adding a new dimension to her international
bargaining power, both in respect of what she had taken, and of what she might
claim in the future. Thereafter the processs could not be checked; for, under
conditions of political tension, the fear of being left out of the partition of the
globe overrode all practical considerations. Perhaps Britain was the only
country which showed genuine reluctance to take a share; and this was due
both to her immense stake in the continuance of the status quo for reasons of
trade, and to her continued realism in assessing the substantive value of the
lands under dispute. And the fact that she too joined in the competition
demonstated how contagious the new political forces were. . . . Colonies thus
became a means out of the impasse; sources of diplomatic strength, prestigegiving accessions of territory, hope for future economic development. New
worlds were being brought into existence in the vain hope that they would
maintain or redress the balance of the old.
NADEL & CURTIS, supra note 32, at 92-93. "It was already the common experience of
all the countries that had taken part in the partition of Africa and the Pacific that, except
for the few windfalls ... the new colonies were white elephants." Id. at 94-95.
[T]heir attraction for investors, except in mines, etc., was negligible; they were
unsuitable for large-scale emigration, and any economic development that had
taken place was usually the result of determined efforts by the European state
concerned to create an artificial asset. Moreover, in most cases, the cost of
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of its own revolutionary history, the United States had a strong interest
in developing mechanisms that would allow it to avoid the label of
colonizer.
The acquisitions from the Spanish-American War provided the United
States with the economic and strategic interest in maintaining an empire.
The United States' expansionist authority derived from something other
than just political machinations at the turn of the nineteenth century.
Such mandate to rule territories derived from the very founding
document of this government-the United States Constitution. Through
Article N, Section 3, Clause 2, known as the Territorial Clause, the
framers envisioned expansion. The Clause provides in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.49

The genesis of the Territorial Clause took place at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787 when the founding fathers briefly contemplated the
future acquisition of new lands by the United States.50 The debate that
administration was a dead weight on the imperial power. By 1900 all these
facts were apparent and undeniable. They were constantly pressed by
opponents of colonial expansion in each country . . . . Yet public opinion was
increasingly oblivious to such facts: the possession of colonies had become a
sacred cow, a psychological necessity.
Id. at 95.
49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The structural framework of the clause is as
follows:
The term "territory" as used in this provision is equivalent to the word "lands,"
and the words "respecting the territory" refer only to the territory owned by the
United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, subsequently
acquired property being subject to the legislation of Congress as an incident to
its ownership. "To dispose of' means to make sales of the lands, or otherwise
to raise money from them, and "needful rules" comprehends all appropriate
legislation, including the passage of all laws necessary to secure the rights of
the United States to the public lands, to provide for their sale, and to protect
them from taxation.
WILLIAM A. SUTIIERLAND, NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 596
(1904).
50. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 10, 12. The actual debate took place on August
30, 1787 under motion of Governor Morris, a Pennsylvania delegate, after discussions on
the acceptance of new states and the claims of the United States to western territory were
postponed. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
\VmCH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 489-96 (Gaillard
Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920). The clause was added to the Constitution by a
vote of ten to one. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
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ensued during the Convention, prior to accepting the inclusion of the
Territorial Clause, projected the dilemma of dealing with the newly
acquired territory as states of "equal rank with other states."51 The
western states, or backlands, were intended to eventually be admitted as
states with equality of privileges. 52 The northwest territory was already
populated by migrants from the original states, and therefore the states
that possessed interests in these territories opposed cession of the
claimed lands to the United States. 53 In opposition, the smaller states
without land claims lobbied for territorial control by the federal
government. 54 The Territorial Clause arose to resolve this dispute over
the backlands to which many of the thirteen original states laid
proprietary claims. 55
Although the Constitution granted power to the federal government to
admit new states and to govern over the territories, it did not expressly
guarantee that these territories would become states. However, the
territorial condition was considered transitory and temporary. 56 It was
understood that the territories would eventually become states as soon as
Congress deemed the people of the territories prepared. 57 Whether the
people were prepared for statehood turned largely on whether the state
was sufficiently populated.58 The three steps for eventual incorporation
as a state relied on successive increases in population of free male
inhabitants and increasing self-governing power until reaching 60,000
free inhabitants with a governor, judges, and representatives with power
UNITED STATES 25 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, and Co. 1833).
51. The idea of having the new states be of "equal rank with other States" was
debated by James Madison on August 29, 1787 to counter Governor Morris's motion to
strike the proposition that the new states would be intended on the same terms as the
original terms. This equal rank was admitted to apply to the small states, but not to the
western states until they themselves became part of the Union. MADISON, supra note 50,
at 487-88.
52. Id.
53. Arthur Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement on the West: The
Attainment of Consensus, 1754-1784, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 13, 19
(John Porter Bloom ed., 1973). These economic interests were the source of ongoing
tension from the drafting of the Articles of Confederation through the ratification of the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See id. at 17-24.
54. See id.
55. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 10. At the Constitutional Convention, during the
session of Thursday, August 30, 1787, the tension was apparent during the discussion of
the formation of new states. Delegates from larger states holding claims in western lands
were hesitant to allow separation of their claims as new states, and wanted guarantees
that these would not be altered by the Constitution. See MADISON, supra note 50, at
491-93.
56. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19
(3d ed. 1910).
57. See id.
58. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 158 (2d ed.
1985).
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to make laws for the territory, "so long as the laws were 'not repugnant'
to the ordinance."59
Prior to the acquisition of the post-Spanish-American War territories,
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 encompassed the underlying theme
and tradition of United States territorial expansion: eventual statehood
and full incorporation of their inhabitants as citizens.6
Congress
produced Northwest Ordinance of 1787 to address the political and
economic problems of the Northwest Territory.61 It eventually became
the archetype for development of all territorrial acquisitions.62
The eventual statehood and full incorporation archetype envisioned
that territories would become states after a period of tutelage, when
enough free males would have settled in the territory. 63 A series of
treaties entered into during this period evinces this point. For instance,
Article III of the Treaty of 1803, whereby Louisiana became part of the
United States, provided "that the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall
be incorporated in the Union ... and admitted as soon as possible ... to
the enjoyment of all rights, advantages, and immunities of the citizens of
the United States ...." 64 The treaty of 1819, under which Florida was
annexed, and the treaties by which New Mexico, Utah, and California
were annexed contained similar provisions.65
This framework for the territories was for the most part, however,
imposed on regions coherent with the original republic. 66 Interestingly
enough though, from the earliest days, the inhabitants of these territories
considered themselves citizens of the United States although residing in
a "territory." 67 In short, the spirit of the Northwest Ordinance carried
with it the practice of a republican government which would bring about
"equality with the mother country."68 As one scholar examining this

°

59. Id. at 159.
60. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (1789).
61. The passage of the Ordinance also had among the objectives to raise revenue
for the then depleted federal coffers and to establish control of the settled areas to avoid
future wars. Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 934 (1995). The Ordinance technically applied only to the
Northwest Territory. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 6.
62. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 6.
63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 158.
64. RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF
RACIAL AsSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-1946, at 188-89 (1972).
65. Id. at 189.
66. See id. at 159-67.
67. Bestor, supra note 53, at 13.
68. Robert F. Berkhoffer, Jr., The Northwest Ordinance and the Principle of
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period of expansion noted, "[a]ny status less than eventual statehood
would have been a betrayal of the very principle upon which Americans
had fought the Revolution." 69
However, the cession of lands resulting from the victory in the
Spanish-American War, with their fairly dense populations posed
difficulties, namely the eventual incorporation of territories inhabited by
people "utterly unlike those of the United States."70 It was at this critical
point in American history that a logical, moral, and legal disconnect
arose. Prior to this moment, the United States and its people sought to
expand by annexing and inhabiting the western territories. In fact, when
considering the status of the new inhabitants of the western territories,
the United States Supreme Court referred to these individuals as "settler
citizens."71
This, in turn, largely justified the treatment of these individuals as
United States citizens since they were citizens who merely moved west.
With the Spanish-American War conquests, there existed economic and
strategic interests in expansion. However, unlike the expansion of the
western part of what is now the United States, incoTT)oration of the more
distant territories involved considerable difficulty. 72
Senator J.D. Richardson of Tennessee echoed this point when he noted
the cause of the problem was the change from democratic expansion into
sparsely settled and connected lands to the acquisition of territories like
Puerto Rico, in which people were acquired without land sufficient for
the migration of large numbers of Americans. 73 Representative James L.
Shyden of Texas, in opposing the grant of United States citizenship to
Puerto Ricans, was a bit more explicit. He observed that the climate and
geography of Puerto Rico were not conducive to Anglo-Saxon government
because the tropical people seemed to have heat in their blood. 74 As a
consequence of these views, the expansion modality of eventual
statehood created by the Northwest Ordinance and the Territorial Clause
was distorted. There was little interest in inhabiting those islands or in
Territorial Evolution, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 45 (John Porter Bloom
ed., 1969).
69. Id. at 46.
70. 2 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 572-75 (1911).
71. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,489 (1856).
72. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309 (1922).
73. WESTON, supra note 64, at 190 (citing 33 CONG. REC. 1057 (1900)).
Alaska was a very different case from that of Porto Rico. It was an enormous
territory, very sparsely settled and offering opportunity for immigration and
settlement by American citizens. It was on the American continent and within
easy reach of the then United States. It involved none of the difficulties which
incorporation of the Philippines and Porto Rico presents.
Balzac, 258 U.S at 309.
74. WESTON, supra note 64, at 195-96.
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allowing the inhabitants of those islands to become United States
citizens. As a result, the eventual statehood as the archtype for expansion was
abandoned. Legal fictions were created to allow United States global
influence without the neccessity of fully accepting the people of color
that inhabited the newly acquired territories. Despite the egalitarian
rhetoric associated with American history, there is an abundance of
evidence demonstrating the jingoistic basis for the denial of membership
to the newly conquered peoples.
The Congressional debates over the status of the Filipinos and Puerto
Ricans aptly evince this point. One Congressional report portrayed the
Filipinos as "physically weaklings of low stature, with black skin,
closely curling hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy feet." 75
Representative Sereno Payne trumpeted census reports taken of the
people of Puerto Rico showing that "whites ... generally full-blooded
white people, descendants of the Spaniards," outnumbered by nearly
two-to-one the combined total of "negroes" and "mulattoes."76 Meanwhile,
Congresspersons viewed the Filipinos as "non-white" and, therefore,
uncivilized and un-American. Comparing the Filipinos to the people of
Puerto Rico, Representative Thomas Spight noted "[h]ow different the
case of the Philippine Islands, 10,000 miles away .... The inhabitants
are of wholly different races of people from ours-Asiatics, Malays,
negroes and mixed blood. They have nothing in common with us and
centuries cannot assimilate them."77 Representative John Dalzell stated
that he was unwilling "to see the wage-earner of the United States, the
farmer of the United States, put upon a level and brought into
competition with the cheap half-slave labor, savage labor, of the
Philippine Archipelago."78 Other representatives shared this sentiment;
Dalzell's comments were greeted by loud applause in the House. 79
Similarly, Representative George Gilbert warned against "open[ing]
wide the door by which these negroes and Asiatics can pour like the
locusts of Egypt into this country."80 Senator William Bate likewise stated:
Let us not take the Philippines in our embrace to keep them simply because we
are able to do so. I fear it would prove a serpent in our bosom. Let us beware
75. 33 CONG. REc. 3613 (1900) (quoting a report of the Philippine Commission to
the President).
76. Id. at 1941 (statement of Rep. Payne).
77. Id. at 2105 (statement of Rep. Spight).
78. Id. at 1959 (statement of Rep. Dalzell).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2172 (statement of Rep. Gilbert).

453

of those mongrels of the East, with breath of pestilence and touch of leprosy.
Do not let them become a part of us with their idolatry, polygamous creeds, and
harem habits. 81

The fear of foreign influx was not limited to congressional debate.
Scholars also contributed to the xenophobia. 82 In a series of articles
published in the Harvard Law Review, this racist fear of foreigners
prevailed. One writer noted:
Our Constitution was made by a civilized and educated people. It provides
guaranties of personal security which seem ill adapted to the conditions of
society that prevail in many parts of our new possessions. To give the halfcivilized Moros of the Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless brigands that
infest Puerto Rico, or even the ordinary Filipino of Manila, the benefit of such
immunities ... would ... be a serious obstacle to the maintenance there of an
efficient govemment.83

According to the United States' then existing model, the application of
the ideals embodied in the Northwest Ordinance should have dictated
that these new lands would obtain admission as States of the Union as of
right when sufficient population had been attained. 84 However, with
these territories, Congress's power was absolutely discretionary. 85

81. Id. at 3616 (statement of Sen. Bate). Though Senator Bate's comments
contained racist overtones, they also expressed a distaste for the imperial nature of the
United States' ambitions. Earlier in the debate, Senator Bate declared:
I was opposed to acquiring the islands of Spain, and for that reason, in part,
voted against the ratification of the treaty of Paris. I am opposed to the
retention of those ... islands a moment longer than is necessary to reestablish
order and security. I do not approve the manner in which the islands and their
people were obtained and have been treated since they came under our control.
But so long as the islands are under our control, and so long as our flag floats
there, the representative of our authority, and peace having been secured, I
shall, as far as may be within my power, advocate and support the extension to
those people of every privilege, right, and immunity which the people of the
States enjoy.
Id. at 3612.
82. See Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico and the Territorial
Incorporation Doctrine: Reaching a Century of Constitutional Authoritariansim, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 55, 56 (1997) (noting that racism by politicians and scholars led to a
plan to maintain the new territories as "dependencies," which were not due the same
constitutional protections as the states).
83. Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition
and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393, 415

(1899).
84.

Robert W. Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas and the Territories in the Senate, in
THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 87 (John Porter Bloom ed., 1973).
85. See 1 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 589 (discussing the difficulties maintained by
Utah in obtaining admission to the Union because of the presence of the Mormon
Church); see also Harrison Loesch, The American Territories of Today and Tomorrow,
in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 238 (John Porter Bloom ed., 1973) (asserting
that Congress has dealt with each of the insular possessions on individual basis).
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The Committee on the Pacific Island and Puerto Rico issued a report
representing the prevalent view of the time. The committee ultimately
supported a discretionary application of their existing expansionist model:
If [the United States] should acquire territory [which was] populated by an
intelligent, capable, and law-abiding people . . . 86 we might at once . . .
incorporate that territory and people into the Union. . . . [B]ut if the territory
should be inhabited by a people of wholly different character, illiterate, and
unacquainted with our institutions, and incapable of exercising the rights and
privileges guaranteed by the Constitution87 . . . it would be competent for
Congress to withhold from such people the operation of the Consitution and the
laws of the United States, and, continuing to hold the territory as a mere
possession of the United States....88

Although the Territorial Clause addressed Congress's power over the
backlands, the insular possessions obtained from Spain, including Puerto
Rico, the Philippine Islands, and Guam, were acquired pursuant to a socalled right of the United States as a sovereign nation. 89 According to
existing American constructions, once acquired, these lands ceased to be
foreign countries and became territories subject to the dominion and
sovereignty of the United States, but would not become a part of the
Union until incorporated by Congress.90 However, there was no
standard general prescription to deal with all acquisitions. Hawaii,
which had been annexed by Congress at the brink of the SpanishAmerican War, was set up as a territory as if it had been in the North
American continent with the Constitution of the United States in full
force and continental tariffs as if it were part of the United States.91 In
contrast, the island of Puerto Rico was organized as a colony92 with
upper officials appointed by the federal govemment;93 Guam was
deemed a naval coaling station; 94 and the Philippines, like Puerto Rico,
was allowed an extremely limited form of local self-governance with the
federal government's presence in the form of military forces. 95
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

These are obviously codes for Anglo-Saxon people.
Obviously referring to non-European people.
s. REP. No. 249, at 8-9 (1900).
BLACK, supra note 56, at 20.
Id.
2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 577-78; see, e.g., LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 17.
See Loesch, supra note 85, at 239, for the proposition that such commonwealth
status has no constitutional basis but was beneficial to both Puerto Rico and the
Philippines in developing self-governing administration.
93. 2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 578.
94. Id.
95. WINFRED LEE THOMPSON, THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAW IN TIIE
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The controversy over these acquisitions at the time was posited mostly
on the divergent views of the constitutionality of the acquisitions.
During the Presidential elections of 1900, this subject was a main issue
with Democrats mainly arguing that the domination over these acquisitions
violated fundamental constitutional principles. 96 In addition, they
argued that these remote and diverse territories would be "rather an
encumbrance than a source of strength."97 Other issues included whether
the new land should have the freedom to formulate its own government
and court system, or whether the powers granted by the Constitution
should fully apply to the indigenous peoples. 98
In addition to the disagreements on the constitutionality of the
territorial acquisitions, the differences in treatment of the territories
could not be reconciled with the traditional application of the Territorial
Clause to the Northwest Territory. While there was appreciation for
Hawaii as a great source of business for the United States, 99 Congress
eventually overlooked the fact that the majority of the population was
Japanese and Chinese with nearly 30,000 Hawaiian aborigines and
followed the traditional application of the Territorial Clause: eventual
statehood. 100 With the post-Spanish-American War acquisitions possibly not
having the same advantages of Hawaii, these possessions, acquired
primarily through the motivations of military necessity and perhaps the
potential commercial advantage, 101 were deemed unworthy of the final
stage of territoriality. During the 1910s, continued colonial status of
those possessions was objected to because the Constitution and the
frame of government are not "well fitted for ruling over distant subjects
of another race." 102 Admittance to the union was seen as even more
difficult due to the differences in languages, customs, and traditions and
viewed as detrimental to the political life of the American people since a
democratic government was viewed as needing homogeneity and

PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO RICO 1898-I 905, at 10 ( 1989).
96. 2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 579. Compare this view with that of Jeffersonians
who claimed the implied powers of Congress to acquire new territory is a constitutional
right. JAMES EDWARD KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN
AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 6 (1982).
97. 2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 579.
98. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 10-13.
99. Id. at 17.
100. 2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 578.
101. THOMPSON, supra note 95, at 2. Another rationale of moral imperative was
advanced by President William McKinley by stating that "there was nothing left for us to
do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and
Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow
men for whom Christ also died." Id.
102. 2 BRYCE, supra note 70, at 585.
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equality of the citizens. 103 These views were fleshed out by the Supreme
Court in what are known as the "Insular Cases," 104 in order to give
meaning to the Territorial Clause application to these insular
possessions.
B. The Creation of the Legal Fiction of the Incorporation Doctrine

The United States' acquisition of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and
Guam gave rise to legal and political debates concerning the
constitutional status of the territories, and the limitations on Congress in
its treatment of the territories and their inhabitants. 105 The disagreement
over the future development of the unsettled territories was somewhat
touched upon by the Territorial Clause. 106 The debate ultimately reached
the United States Supreme Court in the Insular Cases. 107
Political leaders and legal protagonists had distinctively different
views on how to treat the territories and their inhabitants. One
perspective held that the United States had the constitutional power to
expand as did the European powers. But the expansion did not mean
colonialism; it meant the acquisition of territories that would eventually
become states. 108
Authority for this position relied on the analysis of two United States
Supreme Court decisions that defined the "United States" as including
the "territories" and clearly indicated the goal of statehood for all
territories. In Loughborough v. Blake, 109 Justice Marshall held: "[United
States] is the name given to ~ur great republic, which is composed of
103. Id.
104. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1142-43.
105. LEIBOWTIZ, supra note 7, at 17.
106. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
107. See e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138 (1904); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182
U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901);
Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); JUAN R. TORRUELLA,
THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO Rico: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 40
(1985); see also Roman, supra note 8, at 5; Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1119-23.
108. In this view, "according to the spirit of the Constitution, the subjection of
annexed territory to exclusive federal control is an abnormal and temporary stage
necessarily preceding the normal and permanent condition of statehood." Constitutional
Aspects of Annexation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 291, 292 (1898). This view permitted United
States expansion but would accord the newly acquired offshore territories the same
treatment as the continental territorial acquisitions.
109. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 317 (1820).
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States and territories. The district of Columbia; or the territory west of the
Missouri, is not less within the United than Maryland or Pennsylvania States
[and thus the Constitution applies] ...." 110
Chief Justice Taney, in the infamously racist decision of Scott v.
Sandford, 111 held with respect to the territories that "an act of Congress
which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property,
merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
Territory of the United States ... could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law." 112 He went on to observe:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or
at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its
territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of new States. That power
is plainly given; and if a new State is admitted, it needs no further legislation by
Congress, because the Constitution itself defines the relative rights and powers,
and duties of the State, ... and the Federal Government. But no power is given
to acquire a Territory to be held and governed permanently in that character.
. . . The power to expand the territory of the United States by the admission
of new States is plainly given; and in the construction of this power by all
departments of the Government, it has been held to authorize the acquisition of
territory, not fit for admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its
population and situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become
a State, and not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute
authority.... 113

Following the Spanish-American War acquisitions, another line of
reasoning arose. Interestingly, this approach, which sought to limit the
applicability of the Constitution to the territories, arose after this country
acquired distant lands that were densely populated by people of color
who spoke different languages and those lands were not perceived to have
great commercial potential. Accordingly, those supporting colonialism
argued that the congressional limitations applied only to the states or, in
the alternative, that the Constitution granted the nation the legal power to
govern these islands as colonies as substantially as England might
govern them in order to teach nations how to live_ll 4 This position relied
on the terms of the various treaties entered into by the United States and
made much of the fact that earlier treaties had specifically incorporated
previous territories into the Union while no such treaty language was
found in the Treaty of Paris, which established the United States' so110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
(1899).
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Id. at 319.
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 446-47.
James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L. REv. 464, 466-67
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called right to acquire the post-Spanish-American War territories. 115
The Supreme Court decisions in the Insular Cases, which settled the
issue, sided with the exclusionary colonial perspective. They remain
today the most influential decisions in territorial doctrine even though
their values and premises now seem arcane and bigoted. 116
The leading insular decision, Downes v. Bidwell, arose at the turn of
the century. 117 In Downes, the collector of customs attempted to collect
duties on trade between Puerto Rico and the states on the grounds that
Puerto Rico was a "foreign country" within the meaning of the tariff
laws. 118 The controversy centered on whether territorial tariffs could
differ from tariffs in the states. 119 If Puerto Rico was considered to be a
part of the United States, then territorial tariffs would have to comport
with the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution which requires that "all
Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." 120
"The issue raised by the Insular Cases centered on whether the
constitutional restrictions on Congressional authority applicable to the
States serve as a check on the exercise of federal power with respect to
the territories." 121 The Insular Cases also addressed the extent of the
applicability of the U.S. Constitution to the inhabitants of the newly
acquired territories.
Despite authority from both the Loughborough and Scott decisions,
which suggested that the territories should be treated equally as states,
"Justice Taney's language in Scott v. Sandford was dismissed [by the
Downes Court] as dicta ... and, therefore, not binding as a precedent"122
"Justice Brown's opinion [in Downes] was interpreted by other
members of the Court as permitting [a broad] power by Congress." 123
The decision made clear that Puerto Rico, as a territory, was merely a
possession of the New Empire. 124 Justice Brown concluded: "We are
115. See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339 (1901) (holding that there is
no incorporation for a territory if the treaty does not advocate incorporation unless
Congress supports incorporation).
116. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1119; Roman, supra note 8, at I.
117. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
118. 182 U.S. at 247.
119. LEIBOWTIZ, supra note 7, at 21.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
121. See LEIBOWTIZ, supra note 7, at 21.
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id.
124. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1120.
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therefore of opm1on that the Island of Porto Rico is a territory
appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the
United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution; that the
Foraker Act is constitutional." 125
There is little question that at its core, the basis behind treating the
territories differently was that these territories were inhabited by socalled uncivilized savages. Justice Brown wrote:
[I]f their inhabitants do not become, immediately upon annexation, citizens of
the United States, their children thereafter born, whether savages or civilized,
are such, and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. If
such be their status, the consequences will be extremely serious ... _126
It is obvious that in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave
questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws and customs of the
people, and from differences of soil, climate and production, which may ... be
quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by
people of the same race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians.127

Justice Brown further elaborated upon the prevalent nativistic thought:
If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us in religion,
customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of thought, the administration of
government and justice, according to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be
impossible; and the question at once arises whether large concessions ought not
to be made for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories may be carried out, and
the blessings of a free government under the Constitution extended to them. We
decline to hold that there is anything in the Constitution to forbid such action.128

The Downes Court concluded that the territories were different than
the states. 129 Therefore, the Constitution did not apply to inhabitants of
the territories in the same way it did to inhabitants of the states. 130 The
Court concluded that Puerto Rico was "a territory appurtenant and
belonging to the United States, but not a part of the United States within
the ... Constitution." 131
In his concurring opinion, Justice White contributed significantly to
the United States' expansionist modality. 132 Quoting from an earlier
opinion, Justice White wrote: "The Constitution confers absolutely on
the government of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making
125. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,287 (1901).
126. Id. at 279.
127. Id. at 282.
128. Id. at 287.
129. Id. at 250-51.
130. See id. at 251.
131. Id. at 287. The Court, nonetheless, acknowledged that Congress's power
was subject to the Constitution's "fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights."
Id. at 268.
132. See id. at 302-03 (White, J., concurring).
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treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring
territory, either by conquest or by treaty." 133 "If it ... be ceded by the
treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a
part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in
the treaty ... or on such as its new master shall impose." 134
Justice White opined that the scope of constitutional protection given
to the inhabitants of the newly acquired territories depended on "the
situation of the territory and its relations to the United States." 135 Under
this approach, Congress did not have to '"extend' the Constitution, but it
could extend the United States." 136 Full constitutional protection was
reserved for territories that Congress had incorporated into the United
States, as opposed to those merely acquired. 137 The line of acts
necessary for demonstrating an intent to be incorporated was never
clearly settled. Nonetheless, Justice White's concurring opinion and
subsequent Supreme Court decisions recognized the constitutional
principle that a conquering country could take several approaches with a
new territory. 138 The approaches could include (1) admitting the
territory as a state; (2) incorporating it into the U.S. as an integral
territory; (3) leaving it as a territory appurtenant; (4) leaving it foreign
by foregoing acquisition; or (5) pursuing other seemingly appropriate
altematives.139 Justice White justified this discretion by maintaining that the
"evil of immediate incorporation" 140 would open up the borders to
"millions of inhabitants of alien territory" who could overthrow "the
whole structure of the government." 141
Under Justice White's approach, only through incorporation could
alien people attain the rights that peculiarly belong to the citizens of the
United States. 142 Thus, incorporation became a political decision. 143
133. Id. at 303 (quoting American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet) 511,542 (1828)).
134. Id. at 302 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 293.
136. See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALEL.J. 909,961 (1991).
137. See Deborah D. Herrera, Unincorporated and Exploited: Differential
Treatment for Trust Territory Claimants-Why Doesn't the Constitution Follow the
Flag?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 593, 613 (1992) (discussing Justice White's
conclusion in Downes that "incorporation could not occur merely by the exercise of the
treaty-making power; it required congressional legislation"); see also Downes, 182 U.S. at 339
(White, J., concurring).
138. See Neuman, supra note 136, at 961.
139. See id.
140. Downes, 182 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. See Ramos, supra note 42, at 247-49.
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This principle allowed the United States to expand its empire without
being constitutionally compelled to accept as citizens populations that
might be part of an "uncivilized race." 144 Otherwise, incorporation
could trigger "the immediate bestowal of citizenship on those absolutely
unfit to receive it." 145
The question the Insular Cases failed to address is how these decisions
comport with this country's democratic principles and its representative
form of governance. As Professor Neuman eloquently observed in his
book, Strangers to the Constitution:
For the federal government to acquire total governing power over new
territories-more complete, in fact, than in the states-without the consent of
the local population and without according them ... the rights reserved under
the Constitution raise starkly the question of how the exercise of such governing
power can be legitimated. 146

Despite its logical shortcomings, the United States Supreme Court followed
the morally illegitimate constitutional principle announced in Downes. 141
In Dorr v. United States, I48 a majority of the Court adopted the territorial
incorporation doctrine. 149 The Dorr Court recognized that the Constitution
did not fully aJ'ply to an acquired territory if Congress had not incorporated
the territory. 15 As Puerto Rico had never been "incorporated" by Congress,
the limited form of United States citizenship that the Puerto Rican people
eventually received was consistent with this constitutional doctrine.
Two decades later in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 151 the Court reaffirmed the
unequal citizenship status of the Puerto Rican people. The Balzac Court
held that the citizenship status given to the Puerto Rican people under
the 1917 Jones Act did not alter the constitutional status of its
inhabitants. 152 As a result, the residents of Puerto Rico had no right to
demand a trial by jury under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 153 Once again, the Court justified its denial of this right by
143. Seeid.at245-50.
144. Downes, 182 U.S. at 306 (White, J., concurring). In an eloquent dissent in
Downes, Justice Harlan courageously objected to the logic and morality of the
incorporation doctrine: "The Constitution speaks not simply to the States in their
organized capacities, but to all peoples, whether of States or territories." Id. at 378
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 306.
146. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO TIIE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 100 (1996).
147. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298,305 (1922).
148. 195 U.S. 138 (1904).
149. See supra notes 117-45 and accompanying text.
150. See Dorr, 195 U.S. at 142-43.
151. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
152. See id. at 307-09.
153. See id. at 309.
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declaring that "[t]he jury system postulates a conscious duty of
participation in the machinery of justice which it is hard for people not
brought up in fundamentally popular government at once to acquire." 154

IV. THE HEGEMONIC TOOLS OF UNITED STATES CONQUESTS
After the Spanish-American War, the United States had become a
colonial power, and it achieved this with the full endorsement of the
United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court. This
Part seeks to explain how the United States has maintained its empire
without being labeled an empire builder.
The traditional response to the characterization of the United States'
colonial impetus has sought to shift the emphasis from the cognizant
creation of an empire to the "choices" made by the conquered. This
"colonialism by consent" defense contends that the conquered are not
subjugated because they have, by act or omission, accepted the
conquest. 155 This defense, however, can be questioned by examining the
Italian political philosopher Antonio Gramsci' s theory of cultural
hegemony.156
The "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to
the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group;
this consent is "historically" caused by the prestige ... which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.157

Consistent with Gramsci's theory, the consent of the conquered does
not justify the colonial relationship because it is a byproduct of
psychological domination. 158 In effect, the conquered accept their
154. Id. at 310. The Balzac Court, somewhat surprisingly, made completely
inconsistent statements concerning the citizenship status of the people of Puerto Rico.
Despite holding that such citizens did not have a constitutional right to trial by jury under
the Sixth Amendment, the Court announced that the grant of United States citizenship to
the people of Puerto Rico was "to put them as individuals on an exact equality with
citizens from the American homeland." Id. at 311.
155. T. Alexander Alienikoff, Puerto Rico and the Constitution: Conundrums and
Prospects, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 15, 33 (1994); see Ramos, supra note 42, at 285.
156. See Maureen Cain, Gramsci, the State and the Place of Law, in LEGALITY,
IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 95 (David Sugarman ed., 1983); Eugene D. Genovese, The
Hegemonic Function of Law, in MARXISM AND LAW 279 (Piers Beirne & Richard
Quinney eds., 1982).
157. See SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI 12
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans., 1971).
158. See EFREN RlvERA RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE
JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 196-99 (2001 ).
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unequal status and are "[c]ondemned to perceive reality through the
conceptual spectacles of the ruling class, [and as a result,] they are
unable to recognize the nature or extent of their own servitude." 159 In a
recent impressive work on the United States-Puerto Rico colonial
experience, Professor Rivera Ramos observed, "hegemony is both a
strategy of domination and the kind of domination resulting from its
successful realization." 160 Particularly in a colonial context, the perception by
the subordinate that the dominant knows how to lead and prosper,
coupled with the subordinate's lack of political and economic autonomy,
annihilates the subjugated peoples' ability to question their consent to
the conquest. 161 Gramsci' s deconstruction of subjugation thus aptly applies
to the fallacy of colonialism by consent. Gramsci's theory is significant
because the defense of colonialism by consent has served as a means of
reconciling colonialism with the right to self-determination by making
conquest a choice of the conquered.
The illusory reconciliation of this tension was especially important in
the United States. In 1917, under the leadership of President Woodrow
Wilson, the United States had committed itself to the international
recognition of the right to self-determination. 162 Yet, this right conflicted
with the empire that the United States had established as a result of the
Spanish-American War. The inconsistency led to the use of hegemony
centered on an electoral version of democracy, where the colonial people
are given the opportunity to exercise their right to choose. 163 This so-called
procedural self-determination embraces imperialism by reducing the right
to a formal manifestation of consent irrespective of the circumstances
under which said consent was given. 164 For example, "the majority of a
population subjected to colonial rule, may in a given juncture 'choose' a
relationship with its metropolis that is ultimately a denial of
self-determination." 165 So that "[t]he formal act of election ... result[s]
only in the legal masking of a colonial relationship that remains colonial
159. Roman, supra note 8, at 40 (citing JOSEPH V. FEMIA, POLITICAL THOUGHT 31
(1981)).
160. See RAMOS, supra note 158, at 15.
161. Id.
162. Wilson proclaimed that "no peace can last or ought to last which does not
recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the
consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples [from]
sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE
PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 79 ( 1977) (quoting President
Wilson).
163. Efren Rivera Ramos, Self-Determination and Decolonisation in the Society of
the Modem Colonial Welfare State, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 115, 121-25
(William Twining ed., 1991).
164. Id. at 124.
165. Id. at 125.
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American citizenship, for instance, has been used as a tool for
excluding African-Americans, 170 indigenous peoples, 171 and other
nonwhites. 172
The central discussion of the citizenship concept in the United States
Constitution is addressed in the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States,
and the State wherein they reside. " 173
The grant of citizenship is the formal recognition of these concepts
and the guarantee of certain rights and duties, including the right to
suffrage as well as other important constitutional rights. 174 ''Its importance,
[however], does not [merely] lie" with the delineated rights identified by
the courts and legislatures. 175 Citizenship is considered to define the
relationship between the individual and the state. 176 And it is by virtue
of an individual's citizenship status that the individual is a member of
the political community and by virtue of citizenship that he or she is
supposed to have equal rights. 177 Its significance, however, is not
limited to a certain set of rights. Indeed, "[v]ery early in its history the
term already contained a cluster of meanings related to a defined legal or
social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a
requirement of duties, an expectation of rights and a yardstick of good
social behavior." 178 The status of citizen recognizes that such a person is
African-Americans, Chinese, Japanese, South Asian, and Native Americans. See id. at 603.
170. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 481-82 (1856).
171. See Goodell v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 693, 712 (N.Y. 1823).
172. See Ediberto Roman, Members and Outsiders: An Examination of the Models
of United States Citizenship as Well as Questions Concerning European Union
Citizenship, 9 u. MIAMIINT'L& COMP. L. REV. 81, 92-100 (2000-2001).
173. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1. The first section of the amendment, known as
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, guarantees that no state shall abridge the rights of
a citizen of the United States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section
recognizes a form of dual citizenship in the state as well as in the nation. Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1873). In the consequential case attempting to
address the term "citizen," Justice Miller, in the majority opinion in the Slaughter House
Cases, indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment provided a definition of the concept.
Id. at 73. However, section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment identifies the conditions for
attaining citizenship rather than defining the term. Id. at 683. Nevertheless, over time
both jurists and scholars have shed considerable light on the importance of the term
citizenship. Indeed, the term "citizen" has evolved to become something more than just
being "born or naturalized within the United States." Id.; see Roman, supra note 8, at 8.
174. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALEL.J. 1193, 1262-84 (1992).
175. Jonathan C. Drimmer, The Nephews of Uncle Sam: The History, Evolution,
and Application of Birthright Citizenship in the United States, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 667,
667 (1995).
176. Af.EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975).
177. Id.
178. DEREK HEATER, CITIZENSHIP: THE CMC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, POLITICS
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regardless of the juridicial appellation with which the 'new' status comes
to be known." 166
In order to expose this conflict with the development of the right to
self-determination, it is necessary to examine more than just the method
of consent; it is necessary to examine the nature of the consent given the
circumstances of the conquered. As such, in order to track the historical
application of sovereignty principles, it is necessary to unearth the
hegemonic tools that have for so long crippled the right to self-determination. 167
A. The Mirage of Membership-United States Citizenship

In the case of the United States, the tension between self-determination and
colonialism has manifested itself in the creation of tools of both
inclusion and exclusion. These hegemonic creations are especially
noteworthy because, as a consequence of their use, those who reside in
the colonial island territories, despite their subordinate status, still
believe that to be a United States citizen one does not have to be of any
particular national, linguistic, religious, or ethnic background. "All he
[or she has] to do [is] commit himself [or herself] to the political ideology
centered on the abstract ideals of liberty, equality, and republicanism.
Thus, the universalist ideological character of American nationality
meant that it was open to anyone who willed to become [a]n American." 168
However, the role that race has played in the exclusion of members to
the United States' body Rolitic is evidence of the folly upon which said
observations were made. 69 It can be forcefully argued that, historically,
166. Id.; In his recent book, Dean Rivera Ramos reiterates this point when he
persuasively argues that:
[S]elf-determination extends well beyond the act of choosing among different
political status alternatives. It refers to the capacity or, normatively, to the
right to continuously adopt, or participate in the production of, the norms that
regulate the subject's own life . . . . The plenary powers claimed and exercised
by the U.S. Congress over the peoples of the territories subvert the ideal of
self-governance.
RAMOS, supra note 158, at 230.
167. The phenomenon of hegemony can manifest itself in a variety of fashions.
Likewise, the tools or mechanisms used to attain a hegemonic relationship can vary. In
this Article, the use of citizenship, international status labels, and economic dependence
are examined. Other works have examined some of these tools as well as others, such as
the effects of legal constructions. See RAMOS, supra note 158, at 20.
168. See Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REv. 597, 601
(1999) (book review) (quoting Philip Gleason, American Identity and Americanization,
in CONCEPTS OF ETHNICITY 62-63 (William Petersen et al., eds., 1982)).
169. Some groups denied citizenship because of their race or ethnicity include:
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ordinarily one who possesses legal, social, and political power. 179
Consistent with liberal theory's precepts of liberty and equality,180
citizenship is thus linked to the notions of freedom and full participation in
government. 181 Scholars have argued that because equality and belonging
are inseparably linked, to acknowledge citizenship is to confer "belonging"
to the United States. 182
AND EDUCATION 291 (2d ed. 1990).
179. THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1176 (Richard McKean ed., 1941). The
Aristotelian construction recognizes that "[h]e who has the power to take part in the
deliberative or judicial administration of any state is said by us to be a citizen of that
state." Id. at 1177.
180. See, e.g., JOHN STUARTMilL, ON LIBERTY (1869).
181. Johnny Parker, When Johnny Came Marching Home Again: A Critical Review
of Contemporary Equal Protection Interpretation, 37 How. L. J. 393, 396 (1994).
Justice Brandeis recognized its importance, declaring that the loss of citizenship was
equivalent to the loss of everything that makes life worth living. Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). Chief Justice Rehnquist more recently observed: "In
constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States, Congress obviously
thought it was doing something, and something important. Citizenship meant something,
a status in and relationship with a society which is continuing and more basic than mere
presence or residence." Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Chief Justice Warren described citizenship as "that status, which alone,
assures [one] the full enjoyment of the precious rights conferred by our Constitution."
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Justice Harlan, in
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), observed: "[the] citizenry is the country and the
country is its citizenry." Id. at 268 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Waite declared
citizenship "convey[s] the idea of membership of a nation." Minor v. Happersett, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 166 (1875). In other words, citizenship is a broad concept that
signifies not only the rights afforded in the Constitution, it is also is supposed to
guarantee an "individual's membership in a political community and the resulting
relationship of allegiance and protection that binds the citizen and the state." Note,
Membership Has Its Privileges and Immunities: Congressional Power to De.fine and
Enforce the Rights of National Citizenship, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1925, 1932 n.42 (1989).
It includes "the sense of permanent inclusion in the American political community in a
non-subordinate condition." JOSE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND TIIE AMERICAN
EMPIRE: NOTES ON TIIE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIIE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF
PUERTO RICANS 5 n.12 (1979). Thus, citizenship signifies an individual's "full
membership" in a political community where the ideal of equal membership is
theoretically to prevail. Roman, supra note 8, at 8; see also Kenneth L. Karst,
Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. REv. 1, 3-4 (1988). Citizenship
thus refers not only to delineated rights but a broad concept of full membership or
incorporation into the body politic. See Roman, supra note 8, at 3. A correlative of this
concept is a sense of belonging and participation in the community that is the nation. Id.
This last component, which contains both legal and conceptual aspects, demonstrates a
psychological component of the term. This construction of the term suggests the
anointment of citizenship as recognizing an important title that goes to the heart of the
individual's feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the virtue of
this democracy. See CABRANES, supra, at 5 n.12.
182. Drimmer, supra note 175, at 667-68. The scholars can find considerable
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Despite the widely held belief that citizenship confers full membership
and equality, history belies these beliefs. Indeed, American history is
replete with instances where those who should have been or actually
were conferred with citizen status did not enjoy the benefits of citizenship. 183
Despite the liberal notions of full political membership and equality,
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment's declaration bestowing citizenship on
those born or naturalized in this country, it is open to question whether
there are several types of United States citizens. 184 For instance, one can
argue that there are the traditional Fourteenth Amendment citizens who
support in the founding fathers' interpretation of this construct prior to the drafting of the
Constitution. For instance, the authors of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of
national citizenship, in which citizens were to be endowed with equal rights. John Jay,
in Federalist No. 2, observed that "[t]o all general purposes we have uniformly been one
people-each individual citizen every where [sic] enjoying the same national rights,
privileges and protection." THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 10 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961). Madison, in Federalist No. 57, observed:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives [in Congress]? Not
the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant; not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscure
and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of
the United States....
No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession
is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.
THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Scholars have
also agreed that the concept of citizenship is associated with notions of equality.
Professor Ackerman observed that "[i]n claiming citizenship, an individual is-first and
foremost-asserting the existence of a social relationship between himself and others.
More specificaIJy, a citizen is (by definition) someone who can properly claim the right
to be treated as a fellow member of the political community." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 74 (1980). Professor Fox, who recently examined
the history of the term, observed that "Madison and the other authors of The Federalist
Papers may have had little to say about the substance of ... citizenship, but they did
believe that such a thing existed, that it defined a sphere of equality." James W. Fox, Jr.,
Citizens/zip, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 421,439 (1999).
James Kettner similarly noted: "revolution created the Status of 'America citizen' and
produced an expression of the general principles that ought to govern membership in a
free society. . . and it ought to confer equal rights." JAMES H. KETTNER, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870 at 10 ( 1978).
183. This suggests that citizenship is subjective and is to be applied depending upon
whether the collective psyche believes an individual or group deserves the status. As
Michael Walzer observed, "we who are already members do the choosing, in accordance
with our own understanding of what membership means in our community and of what
sort of a community we want to have." MICHAEL w ALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32 (1983). Accordingly, when the citizenry,
through their officials, decide on membership, whether like us or not, "we have to
consider them as well as ourselves." Id.
184. While a host of reasons for these forms will be suggested, the fact remains that
despite the rhetoric of equality and egalitarianism, American citizens live under differing
models of incorporation and participation. See Ediberto Roman, Members and
Outsiders: An Examination of the Models of United States Citizenship as Well as
Questions Concerning European Union Citizens/zip, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
81, 88 (2000).
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enjoy the full panoply of rights and privileges associated with citizenship.
Many people of color, also known as minorities, believe that this "full"
form of citizenship largely applies to white citizens. Accordingly, there
are the "other'' Fourteenth Amendment citizens, who because of
constructions of race and perhaps other impositions of subordination,
enjoy anything but equality and full membership. 185
Finally, there are the American citizens that hold the title of United
States citizens but are not Fourteenth Amendment citizens. They are the
alien-citizens. These are the forgotten citizens and are the focus of this
Article's analysis. They are forgotten because even immigration,
constitutional and other scholars who often examine citizenship rarely
discuss the rights of this subordinated group. The citizens in this group
derived their subordinate rights as a result of colonial conquests
sanctioned by Article IV of the United States Constitution, also known
as the Territorial Clause. 186 The rights of this group do not derive from
concepts of equality, which are the bedrock of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but from concepts of expansionism under the Territorial
Clause and accordingly, the plenary power of Congress. Congress, in
tum, has granted a lesser form of citizenship to the alien-citizens, which
does not include the right to suffrage. 187
For the alien-citizens, the label United States citizen serves a
hegemonic function, which in tum, facilitates colonialism. The power of
the status of citizen is that despite its vagaries, its psychological force is
consequential. Accordingly, even if the subordinate and disenfranchised
citizen does not share the equality of rights, the label alone serves to
foster a sense of belonging. Thus, even if the alien-citizen does not
enjoy the full compliment of rights held by true Fourteenth Amendment
citizens, because of the imagined quality of the status of citizenship, the
alien-citizen will likely still believe he or she belongs. The following
Sections briefly illustrate how one can conclude that there are various
models of United States citizenship and demonstrate how, despite the
label that supposedly connotes full membership, not all who hold the
status of citizens have enjoyed all of its rights and privileges.

185.
186.
187.

Id. at 90.
U.S. CONST. art IV,§ 3, cl. 2.
See Roman, supra note 8, at 3.
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1. The Other Fourteenth Amendment Citizens
a. Indigenous People

After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, United States
courts struggled with whether indigenous peoples were citizens by
birthright. 188 By 1924, indigenous peoples could become United States
citizens through treaty, through allotment, through a patent in fee simple
by adopting the habits of civilized life by birth, and by minor status. 189
With the passage of the Indian American Citizenship Act of 1924, the
United States government imposed a form of United States citizenship
on all indigenous peoples and allowed them to have concurrent
citizenship with their respective tribes. 190 These people were endowed
with a less than equal form of citizenship; they were by no means
afforded the full complement of privileges and immunities available to
birthright citizens. 191
This group does not enjoy the full complement of rights and privileges
available to most other citizens. For instance, they are not allowed to attain
presidential office or any other public office of that type. 192 They are
regarded as being part of their tribal communities and are only afforded
fundamental constitutional rights. 193
b. African-Americans

Another vision of United States citizenship arises from the treatment
of African-Americans. The subordinate and disenfranchised status of
African-Americans is a perception that is not limited to the eras of Scott
v. Sandford 194 and Plessy v. Ferguson; 195 it is a view still maintained by
many Americans, particularly African-Americans.
The very nature of how African-Americans arrived in this country,
188. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the
Native Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship Upon
Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 107, 120 (1999).
189. See id. at 120-23.
190. Id.
191. Professor Robert Porter observed that "Indians today have the status of a
minor-acknowledged as citizens but not fully recognized as being able to care for one's
own affairs." Id. at 135. They are U.S. citizens simply because they have been born in
American soil, but they are regarded as being part of their tribal communities and are
afforded rights and immunities subject to their tribal governments. Id. Only the
fundamental rights of the Constitution are applicable to this group of "citizens." See id.
185. Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States
Maintian a Relationship?, 66 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1461, 1481 (1991).
186. Id.
194. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,481 (1857).
195. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

470

[VOL. 39: 437, 2002]

Membership Denied
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

strongly suggests that, particularly those born here must be citizens, as
they could owe no allegiance to any other government other than their
place of birth. 196 Thus, the principles of equality and membership should
have always applied to African-Americans. They, however, have not.
The history of court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans stems
from the Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 197 where the
United States Supreme Court held that African-Americans, even those
born in a free territory, were not United States citizens. 198
African-Americans were subsequently reminded of their status in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 199 despite the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment
Justice Brown, writing for the Court, upheld a statute that required the
segregation of white and "colored" persons.200 The decision reiterated that
notwithstanding the Amendment's declaration that "all persons born or
196. Drimmer, supra note 175, at 691-94.
197. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
198. The Court refused to recognize citizenship of this group because of their
perceived inferiority. Id. at 407. Specifically, the Court characterized AfricanAmericans "as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race." Id. Accepting differing models of membership, the Court refused to
recognize African-Americans, even those born free, as citizens because "[i]t is not a
power to raise to the rank of a citizen any one born in the United States, who, from birth
or parentage, by the laws of the country, belongs to an inferior and subordinate class."
Id. at 417. African-Americans were subsequently reminded of their subordinate status,
notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896), Justice Brown, writing for the majority, upheld a statute that
required the segregation of white and "colored" persons. Id. at 544. Justice Brown
based the opinion's rationale on a constructed distinction between social and legal
equality. Id. Specifically, the Justice observed: "The object of the amendment was
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the
nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color,
or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality." Id. The social versus legal
distinction of Plessy replicated the subordinated status of African-Americans even after
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. It reiterated that notwithstanding the
Amendment's declarations, "all persons born or naturalized" would be citizens; AfricanAmericans were only citizens in name, de jure citizens, but not citizens in practice. The
concepts of "equality of rights" and "equality of opportunity" were inapplicable to them.
Id. at 554--45. Even after the constitutional Amendment that was enacted to
acknowledge their freedom and equality, the Supreme Court reiterated that they were not
true citizens, but second-class citizens or in Malcolm X's words, perhaps still slaves. Id.
After engaging in an extensive discussion of the meaning of citizenship, Justice Taney,
writing for the Court, noted: ''We think they [African-Americans] are ... not included
and were not intended to be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for
and secures citizens of the United States." Id.
199. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 537.
200. Id.
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naturalized" would be citizens, African-Americans were not citizens in
all respects. 201
Notwithstanding Brown v. Board of Education, 202 a decision that
overturned the tortured logic of Plessy, African-Americans are repeatedly
reminded of their subordinate nature. 203 Such reminders arise from
incidents such as racial profiling by police, also known as DWB or
"Driving While Black," or the more subtle forms of subordination as
identified by Ellis Cose in his book The Rage of a Privileged Class,204
where he addresses how African-Americans, irrespective of their
achievements, are repeatedly reminded of the inequality of society.205
c. Mexican-Americans

Though many Americans know that the United States annexed land
from the American Indians, 206 consisting of approximatel1c "two million
square miles of territory by conquest and by purchase," 07 the Mexican
Annexation is not as recognized. "Prompted by [a] spirit of 'manifest
destiny," 208 the United States declared war against Mexico to acquire
201. Roman, supra note 172, at 92-93.
202. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
203. As a recent reminder of this subordinated status, consider the following story
recalled by lead author Ediberto Roman. I recall when my best friend and closest
version of a brother, who happens to be African-American and named Rodney King,
oddly enough, wanted to leave my house after a long debate about racial politics at
around 2:00 a.m. I told him to stay because the bus station, the New York or New Jersey
Port Authority, was not very safe. He simply reminded me, "Ed, remember I'm black,
everyone sees me as a criminal, so they are scared-I've got more problems with cops."
This saddened me and still does because you see my friend, who happens to be the most
honest and honorable man I have ever met, could never take off the chains of stigma and
subordination. It reminds me that despite my pride and willingness to fight for racial
justice, I can hide because I happen to be light and "appear" to be white. I can put on a
suit or sweats and be the proverbial "boy next door." My best friend can rarely, if ever,
do that and I hope I never forget that fact.
204. ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS ( 1993).
205. Id. at 4-9. "You feel the rage of people, [of] your group ... just being the
dogs of society." Id. at 5.
206. "Fifty years before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, there were Hispanic
urban centers in New Mexico and in Florida. Yet Hispanics, according to most
Americans, are our most recent arrivals-and they have some basis for thinking that."
Harry Pachon, Crossing the Border of Discrimination: Has the Civil Rights Movement
Ignored Generations of Hispanics?, 15 HUM. RTS., Fall 1988, at 32, 33.
207. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Treaties, and
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REv. 201, 201 (1996). What is not as
well-known is the fact "that the United States conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over
half- its then-existing territory. The states of California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as
portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming were carved out of that
529,000 square mile cession by the Republic of Mexico." Id.
208. The taking of the Mexican land was a result of the nation's westward
expansion, as journalist John O'Sullivan noted in 1845:
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery, exploration,
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additional territory.209 The result was the signing of the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo. 210
As had occurred with the indigenous peoples,211 many of the treaty
provisions were never honored.212 As Professor Richard Delgado observed:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo . . . purported to guarantee to Mexicans
caught on the U.S. side of the border full citizenship and civil rights, as well as
protection of their culture and language. The treaty, modeled after ones drawn
up between the U.S. and various Indian tribes, was given similar treatment: The
Mexicans' " ... property [was] stolen, rights were denied, language and culture
suppressed, opportunities for employment, education, and political representation
were thwarted."213

Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, over one hundred years later MexicanAmericans were still not accepted as full members of the body politic.
settlement, contiguity, etc. . . . The American claim is by the right of our
manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which
Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty
and federative self-government entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the
tree to the space of air and earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and
destiny of growth.
Id. at 208 (citing RICHARD WHITE, IT'S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN: A
HISTORY OF THE .AMERICAN WEST 73 ( 1991)) (emphasis added).
209. Id.
210. Among other things, the treaty provided that the United States would respect
private property rights of Mexican citizens in the newly created portions of the United
States and provided that those individuals would be granted United States citizenship.
Id. The treaty provides in part:
The United States of America, and the United Mexican States, animated by a
sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the war which unhappily exists
between the two Republics, and to establish upon a solid basis relations of
peace and friendship, which shall confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens
of both, and assure the concord, harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the
two peoples should live, as good neighbors.
Guadalupe T. Luna, En El Nombre de Dias Todo-Poderoso: The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and Narrativos Legales, 5 SW. J. L. & 'fRADEAM. 45, 45 (1998) (citing Treaty
of Peace, Friendship, Limits and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848,
U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922).
211. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Refonn: Will We
Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 940 (1988) (book review). In fact, the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was "modeled after ones drawn up between the U.S. and various
Indian tribes, [and] was given similar treatment. .. [that is,] 'property [was] stolen,
rights were denied, language and culture suppressed, opportunities for employment,
education, and political representation were thwarted."' Id. (quoting A. RENDON,
CmCANO MANIFESTO 71-72 (1971)).
212. Luna, supra note 210, at 71 (a thoughtful work examining the losses to the
Mexican people after the war).
213. Delgado, supra note 211, at 940.
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For instance, in 1954, the United States government initiated "Operation
Wetback," the campaign to deport undocumented Mexicans, which
invariably included Mexican-Americans. 214
Moreover, one popular depiction of illegal immigrants is that of
Mexicans who have illegally crossed the border, despite the fact that at
least as many illegal immigrants are the result of individuals overstaying
their visas. 215 A classic example of the current anti-Mexican-American
sentiment is California's attempt to implement Proposition 187, which
would have denied illegal aliens access to government-funded social
services including healthcare and education. 216

d. Other Nonwhite Citizens
Nonwhite, nonblack naturalized citizens are also often perceived to be
subordinate U.S. citizens. As addressed in previous works, 217 American
society has imposed a label of foreignness on several groups of American
citizens. 218 These groups of outsiders, irrespective of citizenship status,
are members of an excluded group of society. They are marginalized by
the larger society and viewed as different from true Americans. They
include Latina and Latino citizens, Asian-Americans, Arab-Americans,
and other nonwhites. 219 In addition to being characterized as the "forgotten
Americans" and the "invisible" ones among us, they are endowed with
the immutable characteristic of alien or foreigner. 220 In the white-overblack paradigm, if a person is not white, then that person is socially
regarded as something other than American. 221

214. JUAN RAM6N GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF
MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 229-31 (1980); JULIAN SAMORA, Los
MOJADOS: THE WETBACK STORY 52 (1971).
215. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 955 (2d
ed. 1997).
216. California Proposition 187, § 1, WL CAL PROP 187 (1994); see also Michael
Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 707, 709 (1996).
217. See Roman, supra note 8, at 90.
218. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and
Latinos as "Foreigners," and Social Change: ls Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REv.
347 (1997).
219. Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1095-96
(Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992).
220. Professor Gotanda, in his work concerning "the Miss Saigon Syndrome,"
addressed the label of foreignness in what he termed the "other non-whites dualism." Id.
at 1096.
221. Id. at 1095-96.
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2. The Alien-Citizens: The Citizens Who Are Unquestionably
Denied Full Membership
The last type of United States citizen is the alien-citizen.222 For this
group there has never been any pretense concerning the applicability of
the Fourteenth Amendment or equality for that matter.223 These
individuals did not receive citizenship through the vehicle used to grant
or impose such status on all other groups who have attained it. They
became associated with the United States as a result of being inhabitants
of lands conquered by the United States. These people reside in territories
acquired during the eras of the Spanish-American War and World War
II. The United States Supreme Court and Congress have both concluded
that the Territorial Clause of Article N of the Constitution, and not the
Fourteenth Amendment, determine the rights of this group.224 As
interpreted, this provision endows Congress complete or plenary power
over these people.225 In tum, the Court and Congress have kept this
group in a subordinate and disenfranchised status.
By the time the Spanish-American War ended in 1898, the United States
had acquired considerable experience in creating subordinate citizenship
with African-Americans, indigenous peoples and Asian-Americans. 226
As a result of the war, as well as the conquest of the Hawaiian nation,
the United States began its endeavor as an overseas colonial power. 227
In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially ceded "to the United States the
island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the
West Indies."228 Consistent with the United States Constitution's grant
to Congress of plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Article 9 of
the treaty granted Congress the power over "the civil rights and political
status" of the territories and its people.229 The Treaty of Paris endorsed
the United States' imperialistic venture, as it was one of the first times in
American history that "in a treaty acquiring territory for the United
222. See Roman, supra note 8, at 90.
223. The label of alien-citizen can also theoretically apply equally to the other
nonwhite citizens addressed in the previous section.
224. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,251 (1901).
225. Id. at 251, 285.
226. See WESTON, supra note 64, at 35-36, 194-207.
227. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 36-38.
228. Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. II, 30 Stat. 1754, 1755.
229. Id. art. IX, 30 Stat. at 1759; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States ....").
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States, there was no promise of citizenship."230 In addition, the treaty
contained "[no] promise, actual or implied, of statehood."231 As a result
of the war, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines. 232
The inhabitants of Puerto Rico were eventually granted citizenship in
1917.233 However, unlike their brethren on the mainland, these Americans
are not entitled to participate in the national political process,234 are not
entitled to the full protection of the Constitution, and can arguably be
stripped of their status at any time. 235 Similarly, the unincorporated
territory of Guam has been granted this same form of American citizenship
which clearly states that as a possession of the United States, the island
can be bought, sold, or traded by the federal govemment. 236 Similarly,
the residents of the Virgin Islands were granted U.S. citizenship in 1927
and the inhabitants of the Northern Marina Islands attained citizenship in
1976.237 The unincorporated territory of American Samoa has received
even less-as nationals, they have even fewer rights. Accordingly, the
diluted form of citizenship granted to these people under the auspices of
230. JOSE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 20 (1979).
231. Id.; cf Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic
of Mexico, Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922.
232. JULIUS w. PRATI, AMERICA'S COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 68 (1950). The United
States purportedly intervened in Spain's relationship with Cuba to help secure
independence for Cuba. See H.R.J. Res. 24, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 738 (1898) (declaring
"[t]hat the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent"); id. at 739 ("[T]he United States hereby disclaims any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over ["Cuba]."). The United
States became a colonial as well as world power as a result of the war. 1 PHILIP S.
FONER, THE SPANISH-CUBAN-AMERICAN WAR AND THE BIRTH OF U.S. IMPERIALISM,
1895-1902, at 1-150 (1972); 2 PHILIP S. FONER, A HISTORY OF CUBA AND ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 162-275, 347-59 (1963).
233. The grant of United States citizenship to the Puerto Rican people did not occur
without opposition based largely on racial grounds. See, e.g., WESTON, supra note 64, at
195. Representative James L. Shayden of Texas characterized the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico as a cross between the blacks and whites. 48 CONG. REC. 2797 (1912). They were
"less well fitted for self-government than the full-blooded African Negro." Id. He
believed that the problem of"[c]olor in this matter is more important than language." Id.
Representative James Marn of Illinois opposed citizenship to "a people who were
'somewhat ... strange' to the internal problems of the United States and its civilization
was not to be desired." WESTON, supra note 64, at 196 (quoting 48 CONG. REC. 2797
(1912)).
234. See, e.g., Roman supra note 8, at 1-47 (observing that despite Puerto Rican
born, the residents of Puerto Rico retain an alien attribute despite being United States
citizens as they cannot vote for President and Vice-President and do not have
representation in Congress).
235. See generally Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the
Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV.
393 (1899).
236. 48 U.S.C. § l421f(c) (1994); Guam v. United States, 179 F.3d 630, 634-35
(9th Cir. 1999); Exec. Order No. 10,178, 15 Fed. Reg. 7313 (Nov. 1, 1950).
237. See RAMOS, supra note 158, at 156 n.69.
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Congress's power under the Territorial Clause, changed little in terms of
rights but facilitated a belief of belonging. The inhabitants were granted a
title that suggested power in the political process, but in actuality. They
received little more than a label coupled with a perception on their part
that they were attaining something of consequence.

B. Economic Dependence
In the United States colonial context, the phenomenon of economic
dependence is a fairly unique and unexplored area of subordination. Unlike
the naked form of subordination and abuse by the European powers over
the peoples of Africa and Asia during the seventeenth through twentieth
centuries, the American colonial experience is evidenced not by enslavement
of the conquered or the naked theft of natural resources. It is illustrated
by the attainment of strategic military enclaves and certain markets. The
genius of the American empire building is that it has occurred largely
without the opposition of the conquered. Key to the American endeavor
was the establishment and maintenance of economic dependency.
There is a distinction between dependency and interdependence.
Interdependence entails not only sensitivities, "but also a capacity on the
part of all the actors to affect the outcome of at least some important aspects
of their interactions."238 Though interdependence may at times be unequal
to some actors in some areas, for instance in an exchange between the
United States and Canada, the actors invariably have advantages in other
areas or realms.239 Thus, interdependence is seen as a dynamic relationship
that is characterized by adjustment and agreement between the actors.240
Dependency, on the other hand, is a
phenomenon entailing external penetration of a Third World country's economic,
political, and/or sociocultural processes that is so pervasive that ultimately
crucial decisionmaking power is acquired and exercised by outsiders. The result
is that the developing nation loses control over certain, and often important, aspects
of its domestic and foreign policies. 241

"They have never been powerful enough to protect themselves against
some of the most negative effects of interdependence."242
238. See H. MICHAEL ERisMAN, PuRsUING
RELATIONS 1N THE CARIBBEAN 34 (1992).
239.
240.
241.
242.

POSIDEPENDENCY Pouncs: Sourn-Sourn

Id.
Id.
Id. at 11-12.
ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, THE WEAK 1N THE WORLD OF THE STRONG: THE
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Economic dependency theory provides that the prosperity of developed
countries, such as the United States, depends on their exploitation of less
developed countries (LDCs) for such things as cheap resources and labor. 243
The less developed country's socioeconomic and political dependency is
tied strongly to the develo~ed country, particularly in a country which
has a colonialized history. 2 Dependency theory argues that poverty in
LDCs is a direct result of capitalism and results in LDCs exporting cheap
raw materials and importing expensive manufactured goods. 245
Dependency Theory finds its early roots in Marxist writings on
Imperialism.246 During the scxalled postcolonial period, major writers and
proponents of the theory were economic theorists of LDCs. 247 Probably
the most famous of the proponents on dependency theory was Raul
Prebisch248 who was associated with the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The followers of his theory
249
subscribe to the "Prebisch school" on economic dependency.
The Prebisch
school argued that "[t]he Third World nations cannot ... ever expect to
significantly improve their relative position in the global economic arena
as long as they remained locked into trade relationships whereby they
mostly export a few low-priced commodities to the industrialized states while
simultaneously importing expensive manufactured products from
them." 250
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE lNTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 309 ( 1977).
243. See generally ERISMAN, supra note 238; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 242; LATIN
AMERICA'S EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: lNS111UI1ONAUSf AND STRUCJURALIST PERsPECnVES
(James L. Dietz & James H. Street eds., 1987) [hereinafter LATIN AMERICA'S EcONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT].
244. ERISMAN, supra note 238, at 2-19.
245. Id. at I 0.
246. Id.

247.
248.

Id.

For an excellent historical and analytical account of Raul Prebisch, see
generally LATIN AMERICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 243, at 75-100.
"Prebisch, the first head of ECLA, who died on April 29, 1986, was indisputably the
'father' of structuralism. . . . Prebisch analyzed the relations between nations at unequal
levels of development, using the spatial imagery of center and periphery." Id. at 75.
Prebisch eventually hypothesized
that peripheral countries faced three options [to combat the monetary tools of
the center countries], all with unacceptable consequences: they could have
strong currencies and maintain high levels of imports at the cost of high
unemployment; they could fight unemployment with an expansionist monetary
policy but would thereby create inflation and decrease their ability to import,
because of a fall in the exchange value of their currencies; or, if they used
monetary policy to maintain high levels of employment, but failed to devalue,
their reserves would disappear.
Id. at 87.
249. ERISMAN, supra note 238, at 10.
250. The Prebisch school perceives economic dependency as a "technical problem
rather than the product of fundamental flaws within the capitalist structure of the
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Certainly, there is evidence that the United States has implemented
programs aimed at creating economic dependence by some countries on
the United States. For instance, "[b]eginning in the 1930s, the United
States began to use sugar quotas to integrate the export-dependent Cuban
economy into the United States system and foster economic dependence
of the United States. In this era, the United States also worked through its
diplomats to favor pro-U.S. leaders who would protect U.S. interests and
suppress opposition movements."251
Furthermore, a 1959 report
commissioned by the Kennedy Administration "outlines a strategy for
furthering American interests in Micronesia, in part by intentionally
fostering economic dependence on the United States."252
To discourage independence for United States territories, the United
States maintains relative economic prosperity under the status quo.
Through economic incentives, the United States ensures that the island
territories cannot afford a drastic charge for independence. Some have
international economic system." The Prebisch school asserts that solutions to economic
dependency lie through "more state involvement in internal capitalistic development and
heavier emphasis on economic nationalism (as opposed to free trade) in the relations of
the LDCs with the industrialized world." Id. The Prebisch school was eventually seen
as too moderate by many and a more radical form of the theory emerged in the
"dependentistas." Id. The dependentistas believed that the dependent relationship
suffered by LDCs was "deliberately created and is maintained by the industrialized
countries to facilitate their systematic pillaging of the Third World, [and dependentistas]
are quite skeptical and even contemptuous of solutions limited to economic reforms,
insisting instead that the real heart of the issue is to be found in the broad configurations
of power at both the national and global levels." Id.
251. C. Todd Piczak, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, the
National Security Exception to the Gatt and the Political Question Doctrine, 61 U. Pm.
L. REV. 287, 294-95 (1999).
252. Jon Hinck, The Republic of Palau and the United States: Self-Detennination
Becomes the Price of Free Association, 78 CAL. L. REv. 915, 938 (1990) (citing U.S.
Government Survey Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: Report to the
President (A. Solomon, Oct. 9, 1963) (confidential version)). Early postcolonial
theorists, such as Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Raul Prebisch divided the
dependency of other countries into North and South. Under this view of the dependency
theory (sometimes referred to as structuralist or neo-Marxist), colonialism organized
economic relations between the colonizing states (the North) and the colonized societies
(the South) by transforming the southern economies into satellites of the northern
economies. Because of this economic satellite relationship, the colonial experience not
only failed to transform colonies into developed countries, but led to the eventual
dependence by the South on the North both for import and exports. Inhabitants of
territories such as Micronesia and the U.S. Virgin Islands simply see an association with
the world's great power, even if in a subordinate situation, as preferable to no
association. This does not condemn these individuals for their pragmatic decisions, but
this Article challenges United States policy makers for their failure to formally accept
these people.
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argued that any United States "material aid to the colonies is an
extension of exploitation, given to strengthen the economic dependency
that binds colony to colonizer. " 253 To sever the territorial ties with the
United States would be in effect to cut one's own "economic throat." 254
The United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are peculiarly situated
because they are comparatively small economies in the general
Caribbean area and seek to attract foreign investment on the basis of
their unique characteristics. 255
Most recently, the Puerto Rican
economy, heavily dependent on United States federal aid, has suffered
from budget cuts by the Clinton Administration.256 The Clinton
Administration began a ten-year "phase out" of section 936 of the
Internal Revenue Service Code in 1996,257 which provided tax
exemptions from income made by United States corporations operating
in Puerto Rico. The section 936 tax exemption operated as an incentive
for companies to operate in Puerto Rico. "This unilateral decision by the
United States undermines the Puerto Rican economy and is but the most
recent example of United States exploitation of its colonial possession."258
"It is estimated that 100,000 Puerto Ricans were employed by companies
operating under section 936 (of which 23,000 are in pharmaceuticals)
and another 200,000 indirectly employed."259 Section 936 also operated
as an incentive to keep the status quo. Many in Puerto Rico were
previously opposed to statehood because section 936 would no longer
apply to Puerto Rico. 260
253. Haunani-Kay Trask, Politics in the Pacific Islands: Imperialism and Native
Self-Determination, 16 AMERASIA J. I, 2 (1990).
254.
The United States' story of this form of dependence is as follows:
In the closing decade of the nineteenth century the United States was an emerging
global power that was preparing to compete militarily and commercially with
European nations. . . . Latin America was the only area in which United
States business could expect to compete effectively with European capital . . .
. The islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific would become stepping stones
for U.S. firms to penetrate the fabled China market and from which to compete
more effectively in Latin America against European business.
PEDRO A. CABAN, CONSTRUCTING A COLONIAL PEOPLE: PUERTO RICO AND THE UNITED
STATES, 1898-1932, at 16-17 (1999) (citing PAUL s. REINSCH, WORLD POLITICS AT THE
END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1900)); see also ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR
ORDER: 1877-1920, at 224, 239-40 (1967).
255. Modibo Ocran, The Institutional and Policy Framework/or Foreign Investment in the
Eastern Caribbean, Pueno Rico, and the United States Virgin Islands, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 745, 755 (1994) (citing U.S. VIRGIN lsLANDS INDUS. DEV. COMM'N, THE BEST INvEsTMENT
DEAL UNDER THE AMERICAN FLAG: U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS 1 (1992)).
256. See generally Welcome to Puerto Rico: Economy, at http://welcome.
topuertorico.org/economy.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2001).
257. Id.
258. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1203.
259. Welcome to Puerto Rico: Economy, supra note 256.
260. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1204.
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It has yet to be seen what effect the eradication of section 936 status
will have on the desires for independence or statehood in Puerto Rico
and how much damage to the economy will be done. 261 However,
economic decline has already started.262
Economic troubles arising from the United States are not unique to
Puerto Rico. Guam, in recent years, has experienced a huge economic
growth, thanks in large part to a growth in the tourism industry.263 The
economy of Guam, however, suffers from restrictions placed on it by the
United States government and military.264 Apparently "taxation without
representation" does hold true for territories of the United States. For
example, The Jones Act
classified Guam as a domestic port for ocean transportation but as international
port for air transportation, which resulted in the creation of a monopoly for U.S.
flagged vessels and hindered Guam's economy with high shipping rates. At the
same time, Guam's air terminal subjects travelers to and from the United States
to U.S. Customs due to its classification as a foreign airport.265

The other, smaller United States territories are situated similarly to
Guam. Most people on the other United States territories either work in
tourism, or for the government. The Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands "is a United States jurisdiction consisting of fourteen
tropical islands in the geographical region known as Micronesia-north
of the equator, east of the Philippines and west of the international date
line."266 With an economy based largely on tourism, "the population has
grown fourfold in seventeen years and now approaches 65,000."267 With
a population of only 65,000, the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands (and similarly American Samoa) have largely escaped
261. As the text suggests, time is always the ultimate judge of one's actions.
262. See JOSE TRfAs MONGE, PUERTO R.Ico: THE TruALs OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN
THE WORLD 160 (1997). The Puerto Rican Jose Trias Monge observed that Puerto Rico
was among the developing countries with the highest long-term rate of growth, but from
1991 to 1996 Puerto Rico's rate of growth fell well behind many other developing
countries. Id.
263. Paul Lansing & Peter Hipolito, Guam's Quest for Commonwealth Status, 5
UCLAAsIANPAC. AM. L.J. 1, 1 (1998).
264. Id.; see Details About Guam, at http://www.gov.gu/details.html (last visited
Oct. 20, 2001) (stating that forty percent of people in Guam work for the government
and that Guam is now facing the problem of building up the civilian economic sector to
offset the impact of United States military downsizing).
265. Lansing & Hipolito, supra note 263, at 3.
266. See CNMI Law Revision Commission, The Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, at http://cnmilaw.org.htmlpage/hpg02.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2001).
267. Id.
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the attention of the American people. 268 The other United States island
territories are also largely economically dependent on the United States,
with most working for the government as a result of military bases
within the territories and others working in the tourism industry.
C. The Myth of Sovereign Status

Though all territories of the United States are economically dependent
on the United States, the degrees of dependence vary greatly between
one territory and another. The United States further fostered its dominion
over the territories and at the same time eluded the label of colonizer by
creating the illusion of sovereignty and thus freedom for the territories'
residents. The United States achieved its goal by using the hegemonic
tool that is described here as the euphemisms for sovereignty through
terms such as "commonwealth,"269 "freely associated state,"270 "republic,"271
and "autonomous territory."272 In fact, these terms are used to grant the
illusion to the international community of self-determination. The
reality is often quite different, as can be demonstrated be examining each
territory. Even members of Congress have noted, from time to time, that
Puerto Rico and other United States territories remain in the firm grip of
United States colonialism despite their new status. 273
For instance, though Puerto Rico was granted commonwealth status
in 1952, this status only affords Puerto Rico limited local control. 274
268. In fact, it would probably be news to a large majority of United States citizens
that residents of the Northern Mariana Islands are United States citizens. As discussed
supra notes 222-35, though citizenship implies a bestowing of full rights and privileges,
this is not the case for United States-flag islands.
269. See, e.g., infra notes 310-69 and accompanying text (discussing Guam and
Puerto Rico).
270. See, e.g., infra notes 416-77 and accompanying text (discussing Micronesia).
271. Lizabeth A. McKibben, The Political Relationship Between the United States
and Pacific Island Entities: The Path to Self-Government in the Northern Mariana
Islands, Palau, and Guam, 31 HARV. INT'LL.J. 257,258 (1990).
272. See, e.g., infra notes 369-87 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S.
Virgin Islands).
273. See 142 CONG. REC. E299 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1996) (statement of Rep. Young),
1996 WL 96464 ("After 400 years of colonial rule by Spain ended in 1898, it should not
have taken another 100 years of American administration for the U.S. Congress to define
the options for full and permanent self-government."); 142 CONG. REC. S284 (daily ed.
Jan. 22, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon), 1996 WL 23038 ("The reality is that
commonwealth status ... is simply another form of old-fashioned colonialism."); 137
CONG. REc. H4540 (daily ed. June 13, 1991) (statement of Rep. Serrano), 1991 WL
106487 ("Puerto Rico is one of the very few remaining territories in the entire world
where the vestiges of colonialism still prevail."); see also Jose Julian Alvarez Gonzalez,
The Empire Strikes Out: Congressional Ruminations on the Citizenship Status of Puerto
Ricans, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 309, 309 (1990) ("However much it may try to deny it,
the United States has a colonial problem in Puerto Rico.").
274. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1154.
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Federal laws of the United States still apply to the people of Puerto Rico
without their consent or control.275 Though the people have been granted
United States citizenship status, they are unable to vote in national
elections, and all laws passed by Puerto Rico must comport with United
States laws. 276 These inconsistencies in the granting of an "autonomous"
status, and the resulting unequal treatment by the United States, is
apparent in each territory.
Yet the status of commonwealth serves the hegemonic function,
unlike citizenship which promotes a sense of belonging, it fosters a sense
of autonomy or freedom from foreign control.
As previously
examined,277 a central debate in Puerto Rico's political sovereignty
debate in the territory is whether the creation of the commonwealth
status was the result of a compact between equals.278 The popular
Democratic party, arguably the most popular of the territory's three
major parties, has repeatedly argued that the 1952 status change created
a relationship that empowered Puerto Rico with a true form of
sovereignty, including the ability to prevent the United States from
imposing its will in all instances.279 The reality appears to be otherwise.
After 1952, for instance, when Puerto Rico was repeatedly interested in
resolving its status question, it had to request the United States to resolve
the status question. 280 When the United States failed to act, Puerto Rico
would hold referenda with no binding effect on the ultimate status
question. 281
Other territories have not been granted even the limited autonomy
bestowed on Puerto Rico. In a territory such as American Samoa, the
residents have not been granted citizenship status, or any sovereignty
275. A 1981 study by the Comptroller General of the United States found that
Puerto Rico received less favorable treatment than it would have received as a state
under about twenty important federal spending programs, including Supplemental
Security Income, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, General Revenue
Sharing, social services under Title XX of the Social Security Act, and supplemental
programs for educationally disadvantaged children under the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act See Jose A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional
Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REv. 450,461 (1986) (citing JUANR. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME
COURT AND PUERTO Rlco: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)).
276. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1154; see also Jones Act, Pub. L. No.
64-368, § 34, 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731 (1994)).
277. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1152-64.
278. Id.
279. See, e.g., id. at 1164; Roman, supra note 8, at 26.
280. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1161; Roman, supra note 8, at 10.
281. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1153.
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sounding label, by the United States. 282 The citizens of American Samoa
have not even been granted this modicum of sovereignty. Rather, though
the residents of American Samoa may elect their own local government,
these governmental employees operate at the discretion of the United
States Secretary of the Interior who can remove any government employee at
will_2s3
Following World War II, the United States acquired, from the United
Nations, Japan's control over the islands in the Pacific known as
Micronesia.284 It did so by virtue of agreeing to become the administrating
authority of the Trust Territory pursuant to the Trusteeship Agreement
with the United Nations in 1947.285 This occurred after the United States
had overtaken these islands from Japan and formally ceded the territories
to the United Nations, but still maintained considerable presence on the
territories. The United States, pursuant to the agreement it entered into
with the United Nations, agreed to assist these people to achieve selfgovernment or independence. After decades of control with the purported
purpose of promoting self-determination, the territories became four
separate creations that were to denote the achievement of autonomy.
They are the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 286 the
Federated States of Micronesia, 287 the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, 288 and the Republic of Palau. 289 Though individually negotiated
and purportedly resulting in sovereign states, each entity created, or is
creating, a close, sui generis political relationship with the United
States. 290
Despite the attainment of these sui generis political relationships, the
United States still maintains control over at least one of these newly
created sovereign lands. For instance, though Palau sought to be a
"freely associated state," when Palau attempted to pass a "nuclear free"
constitution, the United States asserted its control over Palau and invalidated

282. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 449.
283. James R. Thornbury, A Time for a Change in the South Pacific?, 67 REV. JuR.
U.P.R. 1099, 1102 (1998).
284. See, e.g., Namoi Hirayasu, The Process of Self-Determination and
Micronesia's Future Political Status Under International Law, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 487,
490 (1987); McKibben, supra note 271, at 257; Comment, International Law and
Dependent Territories: The Case of Micronesia, 50 TEMP L.Q. 58, 58 (1976).
285. Hinck, supra note 252, at 920-21 (citing U.N.-Trusteeship for Pacific Islands,
Jul. 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189.
286. Commonwealth-Covenant to Establish-Northern Mariana Islands, Pub. L.
94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976).
287. Territories and Insular Possessions, Pub. L. 99-396, I 00 Stat. 837 ( 1986).
288. Approval of the Compact of Free Association with the Government of Palau,
Pub. L. 99-658, I 00 Stat. 3672 (1986) [hereinafter Compact of Free Association].
289. Id. at 3672.
290. See Fleming v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 837 F.2d 401,404 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the results of the constitutional endeavor.291 The United States asserted
its authority under the Territorial Clause despite the fact that the territory
was not acquired pursuant to the Territorial Clause.292 In response to
United States pressure, the Palau District Legislature nullified the draft
constitution and canceled the scheduled plebiscite.293
Nonetheless, as a result of a lawsuit filed by supporters of the constitution,
the plebiscite went ahead and ninety-two percent of the electorate voted
in favor of the constitution. The High Court of the Trust Territories,
however, refused to certify the results because of the nullifying legislation.294
Other examples include the fact that in the Covenant with the Northern
Marianas, the United States maintained limited sovereignty in order to
protect its strategic interests.295 That Covenant also ~ave the United
States authority to conduct the territory's foreign affairs. 96
The United States has used this power to dictate issues beyond foreign
affairs. When challenged, the United States asserted its Territorial Clause
powers.297 With respect to Palau, the United States refused negotiations
on the nuclear free constitution demanding that it must have the right to
transport nuclear powered ships as well as ships and aircraft armed with
nuclear weapons in order to carry out its defense obligation.298 In
addition, the compact that was eventually entered into between the two
lands299 allowed the United States to exercise eminent domain powers
over lands for military purposes.300
The practice of granting commonwealth status in order to create a
general feeling of sovereignty was not new. The United Kingdom has

291. Hinck, supra note 252, at 923 (noting that "Palau faced difficulties in drafting
a constitution acceptable to the United States").
292. McKibben, supra note 271, at 275.
293. Hinck, supra note 252, at 926.
294. Id.
295. Commonwealth-Covenant to Establish-Northern Mariana Islands, supra
note 286, §§ 101, 103, 104.
296. See McKibben, supra note 271, at 275.
297. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Richard's v. Sablan, No 8909008, 1989 WL
158917 (D. N. Mar. I. May 25, 1989).
298. Note, Compacts of Free Association in the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands: Plebiscite in the Republic of Palau, 29 HARV. lNT'LL.J. 149, 151 (1988).
299. Compact of Pree Association, supra note 288, at 3673, § 101; Exec. Order No.
12,569, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,171 (Oct 16, 1986).
300. See Bank of Hawaii, Compact of Free Association, http://www.boh.com/econ/
pacifidpal/05.asp Oast visited May 8, 2002); see also Jon Hinck, Comment, The Republic
of Palau and the United States: Self-Detennination Becomes the Price of Free Association,
78 CAL. L. REv. 915, 923-35 (1990).
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applied these same tools with practically the same effects in its territories and
has been criticized as being the only member of the European Union to
deny full citizenship to overseas territories. 301 This criticism falls on the
United States as well for the "granting" of limited citizenship to Puerto
Ricans, Guamanians, and the inhabitants of the other U.S. territories, who,
regardless of the citizenship status, remain different, subordinate,
inferior, and dependent on the mainland counterpart. 302 In short, the
significance of granting citizenship unilaterally on Puerto Ricans and
Guamanians may have been an act of legal significance in Puerto Rico
and Guam, but for Congress, it was an act of psychological
significance. 303 In effect, the accomplishment was two-fold. First,
Puerto Ricans were appeased in the belief that their plea for increased selfgovernment had been answered. Second, Congress retained plenary powers
over Puerto Rico as a dependency and curtailed the nationalistic movement
for independence, thus potentially creating the footprint for further
assimilation304 as it had accomplished with the territories in the
contiguous states. 305
By perpetually denying its imperialistic actions, by granting the colonies
a status which perpetuates the myth of self-determination, and by granting
some autonomy regarding local affairs, the United States has acquired
territories and their people and, without much guilt, treated them differently
from citizens of states in the Union.
Though some might argue that the territories themselves have chosen
this status, as Senator Tydings noted long ago when discussing the Jones Act:
301. See ROBERT ALDRICH & JOHN CONNELL, THE LAST COLONIES 21-22 (1998).
The citizenship scheme applied by the British to British colonies is strikingly similar to
the United States territorial citizenship conferment. Id. In parallel, those born in some
territories have British passports but cannot vote in parliamentary elections. Id. Other
territories do not enjoy all citizenship privileges or the right to live in Britain. Id. In
striking similarity to the fictional introduction of this piece, Britain tightened its
nationality laws to limit the number of citizens in commonwealth territories and limit the
right to live abode due to the fear of migration from the six million British citizens who
would rather migrate than live in Hong Kong after the Chinese government would take
over. Id. The citizenship was thus a "second-class form of citizenship." Id.
302. See Roman, supra note 8, at 15.
303. Arnold Leibowitz, The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico: Trying to Gain Dignity
and Maintain Culture, 17 REv. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 11 (1982). The legal significance of the
citizenship grant by Congress did not come about through political or economic spheres.
It was given effect through the judiciary. Id.
304. See Jose Trias Monge, Plenary Power and the Prinicple of Liberty: An
Alternative View of the Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 8
(1999).
305. See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 144. The Insular Cases seemed to permit,
however, plenary power of Congress to deal with these post-Spanish-American War
territories without the proscribing guidelines of the Northwest Ordinance. See id. This
interpretation of the Insular Cases seems to deviate from the constitutional mandate: the
Territorial Clause, which had as its pragmatic application, the Northwest Ordinance.
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If you are willing to have help of a kind and have no real voice in the government of
the nation to which you are appended, why, then, that is one thing ... If I were a
Puerto Rican that would not satisfy me, just as it did not satisfy George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Simon Bolivar.306

The actions of the United States Congress and the Supreme Court during
the past century demonstrate that, although most of the territories have
repeatedly requested to be allowed to freely determine their own political
future, the United States has insisted on dictating their internal and external
rights and affairs.
Having briefly introduced the hegemonic tools, it is now possible to
reveal the role that each has played in the United States' colonial empire.
The following Part reviews the United States' relationship with its
post-Spanish-American War acquisitions and the remarkably similar
approach to its post-World War II acquisitions. By comparing these two
imperialistic periods, this Article demonstrates how the hegemonic tools
of citizenship, international status, and economic dependency have been
repeatedly utilized to perpetuate the "Empire Forgotten."307 In so doing,
this work seeks to expose the concomitant subjugation of millions who
mistakenly believe themselves to be free members of the sovereign lands
as well as formal members of the United States' body politic. 308

V.

POST-SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR COLONIAL ENDEAVORS

The Treaty of Paris, which culminated with the acquisition of Guam, the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico, is considered one of the initial moments of
United States overseas expansion. 309

306. Hearings Before the Committees on Territories and Insular Affairs, 78th
Cong. 137 (1943).
307. See generally Empire Forgotten, supra note 7.
308. "For neither Man nor Angel can discern [h]ypocrisie-the onely [sic] evil that
walks invisible, except to God alone, by his permissive will, through Heav'n and Earth."
Paradise Lost, Book III, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 70 (Helen Darbishire
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (1667) (resulting from a conversation between Satan and
the Archangel Uriel in which Satan, disguised as an angel praises God to Uriel in order
to obtain from him the location of Eden).
309. See generally Treaty of Paris, supra note 228. While Spain ceded Guam and
Puerto Rico to the United States, the United States purchased the Philippines for twenty
million dollars. Id. art. ill, 30 Stat. at 1756; see also CABRANES, supra note 181, at 1,
19-20. After the Spanish-American War ended, Spain sold the Caroline Islands and the
Northern Marianas. Larry Wentworth, The International Status and Personality of
Micronesian Political Entities, 16 ILSA J. lNT'L & COMP. L. 1, 2 (1993).
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A. Puerto Rico

In the case of Puerto Rico, the illusion of self-rule began shortly after
the conquest. 310 In the earliest stage of American occupation, Puerto
Ricans were led to consider the military rule as a transitional period leading to
eventual incorporation. 311 This belief was shaped by comments such as
that of General Nelson A. Miles, the military overseer of the territory,
who pledged to protect the Puerto Rican people, promote prosperity, and
bestow "the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of the
[United States] Government" upon the inhabitants. This illusion of political
progression was strengthened by the replacement of "the military
government with a civilian colonial govemment." 312
However, on the mainland, subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the
Insular Cases clarified Puerto Rico's relationship with the United
States. 313 These decisions held that the United States Constitution did
not fully apply to Puerto Rico. 314 The Court then proceeded to create the
classifications of "incorporated" and "organized."315 The legal and political
effect of these cases was clear by 1922. The subordinate and subjugated
status of the territory's inhabitants remained intact despite the grant of
United States citizenship in 1917.316 In addition, the decisions sanctioned
the continued treatment of the territories as something other than states,
sovereign lands, or territories intended to become incorporated. 317 In
other words, they sanctioned colonialism. The creation of the incorporation
doctrine was thus hegemonic because it created a facade of association
but, in actuality, it fostered a colonial hierarchy based on the potential of
eventual incorporation. 318 Justice Brown, however, revealed the true
intent of these classifications by noting that the Court's affirmation of
the plenary power of Congress was necessary in order to prevent the
automatic grant of citizenship to the inhabitants of the territories. 319
The line of cases that followed further developed the hierarchy of the
incorporation doctrine, which held that all the rights and privileges of the
310. See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C.
§§ 733, 736, 738--40, 744, 866 (1982)). The Foraker Act replaced Puerto Rico's military
government with a civilian government.
311. Professor Pedro A. Malavet provides a fine discussion of the Spanish rule over
Puerto Rico. See generally Malavet, supra note 22.
312. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1142.
313. See cases cited supra note 107.
314. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
315. Id. at 341--42 (White, J., concurring).
316. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308-09 (1922).
317. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 314; Downes, 182 U.S."at 244; Huus v. N.Y. & Porto
Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392,396 (1901).
318. See cases cited supra note 317; see also RAMOS, supra note 158, at 121--42.
319. See cases cited supra note 317.
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Constitution applied to incorporated territories while only "fundamental"
constitutional rights applied to the residents of unincorporated territories.320
In order to conceal this outsider status, the role of citizenship as a
hegemonic tool took form in the Jones Act of 1917.321 The Act was a
concession that responded to the xenophobic fear that full incorporation
of Puerto Rico would darken the American frontier. 322 By creating a
three-branch system, establishing a Bill of Rights and granting the inhabitants
a diluted version of United States citizenship, the Act, in effect, lessened
the colonial appearance of the United States' relationship with Puerto
Rico. 323 Yet the decision to grant United States citizenship to the people
of Puerto Rico enabled the United States to maintain Puerto Rico as an
American possession.324 In addition, as stated in the Jones Act: "All
laws enacted by the Legislature of Porto Rico325 shall be reported to the
Congress of the United States ... which hereby reserves the power and
authority to annul the same."326 Citizenship status, as well as the replication

320. In subsequent Insular Cases the Court recognized the following as
fundamental: the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures in Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1979) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to Puerto Rico and that a Puerto Rican statute authorizing the police
to search the luggage of a person arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States was
unconstitutional); the Due Process Clause in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing
Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668-69 n.5 (1974); the Equal Protection Clause in Examining Board
of Engineers, Architects, & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 601 (1976); the
First Amendment right to free speech and the constitutional right to travel in Balzac v.
Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 314 (1922) (holding that a prosecution for liable was not a
violation of the First Amendment and that the right to a jury trial is not a fundamental
right as applied to unincorporated territories); and Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6
(1978) (stating that there is a virtually unqualified constitutional right to travel between
Puerto Rico and the fifty states of the Union).
321. Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, 39 Stat 951 (1917) (codified at 48 U.S.C. §
731 (1994)).
322. See RONALD FERNANDEZ, THE DISENCHAN1ED ISLAND: PUERTO Rico AND THE
UNITED STATES IN THE 1\VENTIETH CENTURY 57 (2d ed. 1996).
323. See CABRANES, supra note 181, at 72 (stating that the Jones Act granted
substantially more government authority to Puerto Rico than had been allowed under the
Foraker Act). Under the Jones Act, the Governor continued to be appointed by the
President, but the Foraker Act's legislative branch's House of Delegates and Executive
Council were replaced with a nineteen-member Senate and a thirty-nine-member House
of Representatives elected by popular vote. See Jones Act, §§ 12, 26-27, 39 Stat. at
955-61.
324. See CABRANES, supra note 181, at 144; RAMOS, supra note 158, at 147;
Leibowitz, supra note 7, at 146.
325. See generally Manuel Del Valle, Puerto Rico Before the United States
Supreme Court, 19 REV. JUR. U.I.P.R. 13 (1984), WL 19 REVJUIPR 13.
326. Jones Act§§ 34, 39.
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of the American structure of government, nonetheless resulted in the
illusion of incorporation. The status of citizenship was particularly
helpful in the United States' ability to manage the territory's people.
The Puerto Rican people were granted a status that was supposed to
mean something, something important. 327 Yet these people are denied
the right to vote for President and Vice-President and lack the fundamental
right to congressional representation which has characterized United
States citizenship. 328 Nevertheless, the grant of this diluted form of
citizenship served its purpose from the perspective of the metropolis.
The grant promoted and assisted in establishing a sense of belonging on
the part of the inhabitants as well as a sense of loyalty. 329 The grant was
also a response and attack on a growing nationalism movement in Puerto
Rico's political spectrum. 330
The grant of the statutory citizenship received by the people of Puerto
Rico is also an example of the territory's status as a United States
colony. The label that was bestowed upon the people by the dominant
group provides inferior rights and is perhaps not even a status that was a
matter of choice. Perhaps the best example of this stems from the case
of Juan Mari Bras, a Puerto Rican born attorney and independence
advocate. 331 After Mari Bras' right to vote in a Puerto Rican election
was challenged following his previous effort at renouncing his United
States citizenship in Venezuela, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico
upheld the lower court's ruling that Mari Bras had the right to vote in the
local elections. 332 In 1998, the United States State Department vacated
the certificate of loss of nationality that had been previously issued to
Mari Bras. 333 "The State Department [noted] that it considered Mari
Bras a United States citizen 'by virtue of [his] birth in Puerto Rico. "'334
The Mari Bras case in at least some respects, represents that for the
people of Puerto Rico, United States citizenship still may not be a matter
327. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,652 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In
constitutionally defining who is a citizen of the United States, Congress obviously
thought it was doing something, and something important.").
328. As the lead author's father, Andres Roman observed, "I was obligated to
follow federal law when I lived both in Puerto Rico and New York. Why is it that
federal law did not follow me when I moved to Puerto Rico? Am I less loyal here, less
of a man or citizen?"
329. See RAMOS, supra note 158, at 148 (citing MARIA EUGENIA EsTADES FONT, LA
PRESENCIA MILITAR DE ESTADOS UNIDOS IN PUERTO RICO 1898-1918: lNTERESES
EsTRATEGICOS Y DOMINACION COLONIAL (1988)).
330. Id. at 202.
331. RamirezdeFerrerv. Mari Bras, 144 P.R. Dec. 141, 1997 WL 870836 (P.R. 1997).
332. See id.
333. RAMOS, supra note 158, at 175.
334. Id. (quoting Robert Friedman, Renunciation Oath Set Aside in Case of U.S.
Citizen Mari Bras, SAN JUAN STAR, June 5, 1998, at 8).
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of choice. The case suggests that the imposed status is a prerequisite to
being a Puerto Rican. Unlike other United States citizens who can
renounce their status, Mari Bras was refused this right, if in fact it is a
right and not merely a label.
As alluded to in earlier works, 335 although the United States did not
want to fully incorporate Puerto Rico or include its people as fully equal
members of the body politic, there was substantial strategic interest in
ensuring that Puerto Rico be maintained as an American military
enclave.336 As part of the Monroe doctrine, Puerto Rico was to be a base
to promote American interest in the Carribean, Mexico, and Central
America, particularly in light of the creation of the Panama Canal. As
Representative Cooper of Wisconsin observed:
We are never to give up Porto Rico for, now that we have completed the
Panama Canal,337 the retention of the island becomes very important to the
safety of the canal, and in that way to the safety of the Nation itself. It helps to
make the Gulf of Mexico an American lake. I again express my pleasure that
this bill grants these people citizenship.338

In 1943, the illusion of membership had still not evolved into incorporation
with the United States' body politic.339 The Puerto Rican Legislature
responded by demanding that Congress terminate "the colonial system of
government'' once and for all.340 After decades of United States congressional
and executive studies, the United States denied Puerto Rico the options
of independence or statehood.341 With the help of influential Puerto
Rican leaders, the hegemonic tool of international status was used and
the colonial relationship was masked with the creation of commonwealth
status.342 This compromise afforded Puerto Ricans only limited local
control, but to this day, maintains the less-than-equal status.343 The loss
of citizenship has also been used during local elections and status
335. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1119.
336. See id. at 1156.
337. See id. at 1149.
338. 54 CONG. REC. H4170 (Feb. 24, 1917) (statement of Sen. Cooper).
339. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1151.
340. Autonomy Is Asked in Puerto Rico Vote, N.Y. TlMEs, Feb. 11, 1943, at 6.
341. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1209.
342. Id.
343. During the recent Presidential ballot contest, we have heard much of the voting
rights of overseas service men and women. Are the thousands of United States citizens
that are Puerto Ricans who fought for and still defend this country less worthy to cast
their vote from overseas? The lunacy of their anomalous status is almost unbelievable,
but is unfortunately their plight and evidence of their unacceptance.
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referenda to provoke fear of being further disassociated. 344 In addition,
as addressed more fully in the previous section, Puerto Rico is burdened
with being almost completely economically dependent on the United
States. 345
Today, the fate of the Puerto Rican people lies at the whim of American
political leaders. The current situation on the island of Vieques is
bringing international attention to an untenable situation in the United
States territory. 346 However, the use of the island for bombing purposes
is not a recent event. Since 1940, when the United States Navy took
over two-thirds of the twenty-one mile by four mile island of Vieques,
the United States Navy has conducted training exercises on the island,
which have included air, land, and sea bombings. 347 Thus, Puerto Rico
still serves, at least in some respects, the United States' strategic interests.
The use of the island for bombing practice has also had negative
effects on the 9500 inhabitants. Recent studies indicate that "the bombing has
hurled haunting levels of toxins into Vieques' air, water and fishing
grounds-which some believe is why the cay has a 27% higher cancer
rate than the main island. " 348
Last January, Bill Clinton, who feels Puerto Rico's pain-especially now that
Hillary needs the votes of New York's Puerto Rican emigres-made an
agreement with the island's government. Puerto Rico would let the Navy stay
until 2003, using only dummy bombs. In return, Puerto Rico would get,
essentially, a bribe: some $40 million in additional Washington aid. But most
Puerto Ricans tell pollsters they want the Navy out now. Indeed, Vieques
residents may soon pass a referendum that could void the three-year pact. 349

On Thursday, June 14, 2001 President Bush said: "My attitude is that
the Navy ought to find somewhere else to conduct its exercises for a lot
of reasons. One, there has been some harm done to people in the past.
Secondly, these are our friends and neighbors and they don't want us
there."350 However, top Republicans in Congress have called for hearings
344. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1166.
345. See discussion supra Part V.A.
346. See, e.g., James Anderson, Vieques Vigil a Quagmire, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 18,
1999, at 9A; Tim Padgett, The Guns of May, the Sounds of Countrymen, TIME, May 15,
2000, at 4; Gerand Seenan, Puerto Ricans in UK to Fight U.S. Bombs, GUARDIAN, Feb.
29, 2000, 2000 WL 15584060.
347. Lillian Irizarry, Vieques, Cleanup May Take Decades, AP ONLINE, June 14, 2001,
2001 WL 22915389; see also Puerto Rico Journey: The Eastern Islands, Vieques, at
http://www.iit.edu/~PR/prvie.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001) (giving the size and
population of the island).
348. Karen Gullo, Study Looks at Health of Hispanics, AP ONLINE, Feb. 25, 2000,
2000 WL 14324018; Padgett, supra note 346, at 4.
349. Padgett, supra note 346, at 4.
350. See Kate Snow & Dana Bash, CNN Washington Bureau, Republicans Want
Hearings into Vieques Decision (June 14, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/
ALLPO!itics/06/14/congress. vieques.02/index.html.
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on the White House decision to halt bombing exercises.351 Though it is
yet to be seen if the bombing has, indeed, come to an end, environmentalists
advise that it could take decades "to remove unexploded ammunition and
clean up the battered reefs."352 futerestingly, irrespective of the result of
President Bush's efforts, his use of words such as "friends" and "neighbors"
merely highlights the widely held belief that the Puerto Rican people are
something other than United States citizens. Apparently, according to the
administration, the bombings should end, not because the attacks are on
our own people, but because the attacks are on our ''friends" and "neighbors."

B. Guam
Under the control of the United States, the people of Guam, living in
an unincorporated territory, do not possess even the modicum of local
autonomy brought by the anomalous commonwealth status. fustead,
they live in a state akin to the naked colonialism of centuries past.
Guam, the other major acquisition of the Spanish-American War, was
ceded to the United States along with Puerto Rico in the Treaty of
Paris. 353 Since its acquisition in 1898, the United States has maintained
absolute and plenary power over Guam under the Territorial Clause of
the United States Constitution.354
Yet, like the people of Puerto Rico, the people of Guam have repeatedly
requested autonomy. fu 1901, Guamanians requested a change from a
military government.355 This effort died in Congress.356 fu 1933, the
people of Guam refused to fill the seats of a newly created legislature
because it had only advisory powers.357
fuitially the territory was controlled by the Department of the Navy,
and then, after over fifty years of absolute rule, control of Guam was
transferred to the Department of the futerior. 358 fu 1949, after a challenge to
the Naval Governor by the Guamanian Legislature, President Truman
appointed a civilian governor and transferred the administration of the
351. Id.
352. Irizarry, supra note 347.
353. Samuel J. Cohen, The Extension of U.S. Tax Treaties to U.S. Territories, as
Illustrated by the Example of Guam, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 32, 33 (1992).
354. McKibben, supra note 271, at 257.
355. Id. at 287.
356. Neil S. Solomon, The Guam Constitutional Convention of 1977, 19 VA. J.
INT'LL. 725, 744 (1979).
357. Id. at 734.
358. McKibben, supra note 271, at 287.
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territory from the Navy to the Department of the Interior. 359 Yet this
modification procured very little for the Guamanians since the Organic
Act of 1950 only established a local government structure and granted
statutory United States citizenship similar to the diluted form of
citizenship granted to the people of Puerto Rico. As such, it failed to
provide self-determination because it maintained the trapping of foreign
control and failed to allow full incorporation as evidenced by the refusal
to grant the Guamanians the right to elect United States federal
representatives. 360 In 1970, the people of Guam were afforded a form of
quasi-representation similar to that afforded to the people of Puerto Rico
which entails the election of a nonvoting representative who exercises a
lobbyist-like role in Congress. 361 However, Guamanians' inability to
participate in United States Presidential elections has remained
unaltered. This inequity was further heightened when the United States
Supreme Court dissolved the Guamanian Supreme Court. 362 This action
was consistent with the Court's previous preacquisition confirmation of
Congress' unconditional authority over the territories which is "an
incident of sovereignty, and continues until granted away." 363
Guam, like Puerto Rico, is plagued with political strife over its future
leading to a lack of solidarity in its status goal. For instance, after
requesting that the United States allow it to draft a constitution, the
electorate refused to support it. 364 Similarly, a 1987 commonwealth
plebiscite resulted in a thirty-nine percent turn-out with little more than
fifty percent approving the referrendum. 365
The Guamanian's relentless quest for autonomy has resulted in attempting
the only option, compromise. Hoping to emulate the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico, the Guamanian Legislature established a Commission of
Self-Determination with the belief that commonwealth status will
procure greater autonomy. 366 The United States' response to creating the
Commonwealth of Guam has been sluggish.367 Much like the Puerto
Rican efforts to change Puerto Rico's status, the Guamanian efforts in
Congress have died in legislative session. 368 Currently, this request for
359. Id.
360. Id. at 287-89.
361. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
362. Tenitory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195,202 (1977).
363. Nat'! Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879).
364. Solomon, supra note 356, at 802.
365. McKibben, supra note 271, at 290 (citing Franklin J. Arceo Quitugua, Speaker
of the 19th Guam Legislature, at St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands (Dec. 9, 1988)).
366. Jon M. Van Dyke et al., Self-Determination for Nonself-Goveming Peoples
and for Indigenous Peoples: The Cases of Guam and Hawaii, 18 U. HAW. L. REV. 623,
626 (1996).
367. Id. at 628.
368. Id.
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an artificial form of autonomy afforded by commonwealth status is
ongoing.
C. U.S. Virgin Islands

The U.S. Virgin Islands were "discovered" by Christopher Columbus
on his second voyage to the New World. 369 Christopher Columbus
landed on St. Croix in 1493 and named the island "Santa Cruz."370 Since
its so-called discovery, six flags have flown over these islands before
coming into the possession of the United States: Spanish, Dutch, British,
French, Knights of Malta, and Danish.371 According to 1990 census
information, there are a little over 100,000 people living on the three
U.S. Virgin Islands. 372 Though the U.S. Virgin Islands are composed of
more than fifty islands, most people live on three major islands (St.
Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix) with a surface area a little over 130
square miles.373
"The United States bought St. Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix from
Denmark in 1916, after two previous attempts to purchase these islands
had failed."374 Fearing that Germany might acquire the islands, the United
States agreed to pay Denmark twenty-five million in gold for what is
now known as the U.S. Virgin Islands.375 Interestingly enough, though
Danish voters approved the sale through a plebiscite, the residents of the
U.S. Virgin Islands were never consulted.376 As with American Samoa
and Guam, the islands were initially under the direction of the
Department of the Navy, and later turned over to the Department of the
Interior.377 The United States Navy governed the islands because they were
intended to be part of naval operations fronting German activity in the
Atlantic Ocean. At the time of acquisition, the island population had
369. Facts and Figures about the U.S. Virgin Islands-St. Thomas, St. Croix, St.
John, Water Island, at http://www.usvi-info.com/infousvi/faqsguide-info.html Oast
visited Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Facts and Figures].
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United
States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. R.Ev. 445, 494-95 (1992).
375. See id.; see also Facts and Figures, supra note 369 (stating that the purchase
was made in gold).
376. Van Dyke, supra note 374, at 495 (''The Danish voters approved this sale in a
plebescite, but no vote was taken among the residents of the Virgin Islands.").
377. Id. at 496.

495

almost disappeared as a result of malaria and gastroentent1s.
Economically, the islands were devastated; they were operating at a net
loss of $190,000 a year.
In 1917, Congress provided the islands with an organic act that
established a temporary government that replaced the Navy. 378 This act
provided a judicial system, a bicameral legislature and a governor
appointed by the President of the United States. 379 The act contained a
property requirement for suffrage. Some years later another organic act
was passed that created a "municipal counsel" for each main island. 380
In 1927, residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands were granted American
citizenship, though much like Guam and Puerto Rico, no voting rights in
national elections were conferred, and shortly thereafter, the military
governor was replaced by a civilian. 381 The governor was appointed by
the President and approved by the Senate. 382
In 1964, the people of the U.S. Virgin Islands held their first
constitutional convention which stated, in part: "The People of the
Virgin Islands are unalterably opposed to annexation of the Virgin
Islands by any State of the Union as a county, city or precinct, or to any
commonwealth or other territory under the jurisdiction of the United
States."383 The convention also included provisions indicating a desire
to hold local elections for iovernor, and to eliminate the President's veto
power over local legislation.3 Under increasing pressure from the U.S.
Virgin Islands, the United States Congress passed the "Elective Governor
Act of 1968."385 The Act provides that the U.S. Virgin Islands would
have a locally elected governor, abolishes the Department of the
Interior's control over the islands, and eliminates the President's ability
to veto local legislation. 386 The islands then drafted a constitution that
was approved by Congress in 1981.387 In 1993, despite the shortcomings
of unincorporated status, the people of the U.S. Virgin Islands voted in a
status referendum to maintain their relationship with the United
States. 388
Today the U.S. Virgin Islands exist in what has become known as an

378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 496-97.
381. Id.; see also Facts and Figures, supra note 369 (stating that the citizens of the
U.S. Virgin Islands have no right to vote in Presidential elections).
382. Van Dyke, supra note 374, at 496.
383. Id. at 497-98.
384. Id. at 497.
385. Id. at 498.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
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"autonomous territory."389 The U.S. Virgin Islands is an unincorporated
territory that is governed under the Territorial Clause of the Constitution.
Similar to Puerto Rico and Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, as
unincorporated territories, are governed by the Supreme Court's holdings
regarding the Insular Cases and their inhabitants are only guaranteed
"fundamental rights." These inhabitants are only allowed nonvoting
delegates to the United States Congress. Because of their ''unique cultures,
their small size and their distance from the mainland," these territories "may
never become states."390

D. American Samoa
American Samoa is composed of seven islands in the South Pacific.391
Located south of the equator, American Samoa is also the United States'
southern-most territory.392 In 1872, United States Navy Commander
Richard Meade visited Pago Pago and made an agreement with the Samoan
High Chief that was rejected by the United States Government. However,
on April 17, 1900, American Samoa and the United States signed the Deed
of Cession, which resulted in American Samoa becoming a territory of the
United States.393 The United States came into possession of Samoa through
a series of treaties with Germany and Great Britain and American Samoa
was deemed an ''unorganized territory."394 Under the Treaty of Berlin,
which was ratified by the United States on February 16, 1900, the United
States gained rights over the island group. 395 During the 1940s, as Japan's
power in the Pacific grew, the importance of Samoa to United States
interests also increased.396 By 1940, the U.S. Naval Station on the main
island of Tutuila became increasingly important to American interests. In
fact, during World War II, there were more United States military personnel

389. Id.
390. Id. at 447.
391. Office of the Governor, American Samoa, at http://www.government as/gov.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2002).
392. American Samoa, at http://www.ipacific.com/samoa/samoa.html (last visited
Oct. 26, 2001).
393. It should be noted that while commonly referred to as a territory under 8
U.S.C. § 110l(a)(29) (1994), American Samoa is considered an "outlying possession[]
of the United States." Id.
394. Thornbury, supra note 283, at 1100.
395. Samoanet, About American Somoa, at http://www.samoanet.com/amsamoa/
(last modified Aug. 2, 1997).
396. Id.
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on the island ofTutuila than there were native Samoans. 397
The population of American Samoa is approximately 55,000 people,
with the majority of the natives living on the island of Tutuila. 398 The
people of American Samoa are United States nationals, but not United
States citizens. 399 As with the other territories, the United States controls, to
a large extent, the internal functions of the government of American
Samoa. fuitially, in American Samoa, the U.S. Navy controlled governmental
functions. 400 In the 1950s, responsibility for governing the island shifted
from the Navy to the Department of the Interior. 401
Though American Samoa's government is composed of branches
similar to that of the United States system, with an executive, legislative,
and judiciary branch, the United States Secretary of the Department of
the Interior "holds the power of appointment over virtually every
member of the government in the territory, including the judiciary."402
Though the Samoan Legislature has statutes similar to those used in the
United States, the Secretary of the Interior holds nearly all legislative,
executive, and judicial power over Samoa.403 The Secretary of the Interior
can appoint or remove government employees at will and even overrule
any decisions of the Samoan courts. 404 Thus, as in the other territories,
American Samoa has been denied the right to self-determination, and
instead, has been relegated to a position as a possession of the United
States and is denied the same rights that the United States affords its
mainland citizens. Unlike other United States territories, United States
citizenship has not been extended to American Samoans405 and it
appears unlikely that this will change in the near future.
Early on in its relationship with the United States, Samoans were allowed
to manage their island while the United States concentrated on the operation
of the coaling station and naval base at Tutuila. This arrangement was
altered in the 1930s when, as a result of the Japanese activity in the
Pacific, Samoa's strategic location became crucial. Not unlike the change in
Puerto Rico's status during the exact same period, in 1951, the United
States' military control in Samoa was altered via the President's
executive order to the Department of the Interior removing the Navy as
the administrating authority of Samoa. 406 This resulted in a civilian
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
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government that, although "American in appearance ... [was and
remains] illusory." 407 Samoa's government is illusory because it does
not have full legislative authority. Its enactments and resolutions have
no bindinj authority since they are simply recommendations made to the
governor. 8 Furthermore, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
has appointment power over virtually every member of the government
in the territory, including the judiciary.409
Presently, American Samoa is still an unorganized and unincorporated
territory. Much like Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, as
an unincorporated territory, pursuant to the Insular Cases, the residents
of Samoa are only entitled to the fundamental rights of the United States
Constitution. The colonial relationship between the United States and
American Samoa is purported to be one which preserves indigenous
culture.410 However, a substantial indigenous population has no relevance
with respect to the protections to which "persons" within the jurisdiction
are entitled. As with the post-Spanish-American War conquests, American
Samoa only has the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution.411
The lack of equality and opportunities provided to most United States
citizens goes further than the textual boundaries of the Constitution.
Much like the other United States possessions, American Samoa is
economically dependent on the United States. For instance, one of the
largest employers in American Samoa is the American Samoan
government.412 In addition, twenty-eight percent of the total work force
in American Samoa is employed by only two canneries.413 The
unemployment rate in 1993 was sixteen percent and the average per
capita income in 1993 was $5000.414 However, the income tax laws are
a mirror image of those enforced in the United States.415

101 (1957).
407. Thornbury, supra note 283, at 1101 (emphasis added).
408. Id. at 1102.
409. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
410. Bank of Hawaii, American Samoa Economic Report, available at
http://www.boh.com/econ/pacific/amsamoa.pdf (April, 1997).
411. Id.at 9.
412. Id. at 12-13; see also American Samoa, at http://www.ciagov/cia/publications/
factbook /geos/aq.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
413. Bank of Hawaii, supra note 410, at 12.
414. Id. at 12; see also American Samoa, at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook /geos/aq.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
415. Bank of Hawaii, supra note 410.
UNITED STA1ES
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VI.

POST-WORLD WAR II COLONIAL ENDEAVORS

A. Micronesia and the Northern Mariana Islands
''There are only 90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?',4 16
"[A]nd Micronesia would become the newest, the smallest, the
remotest non-white minority in the United States political
family-as permanent and as American, shall we say, as the
American Indian." 417
As in the past, after World War II, the United States acquired new
territories from other colonial powers. Micronesia has had four colonial
rulers: Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States.418 The islands that
comprise Micronesia or the Trust Territory of the Pacific419 consist of three
archipelagoes: the Marshall, 420 the Carolines,421 and the Marianas. The
416. DONALD F. McHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 87 (1975) (Henry A.
Kissinger, as quoted by Walter Hickel).
417. Id.(quoting Lazarus Salii). Lazarus Salii was elected as chairman of the
Micronesian Political Status Commission in 1967. Id. at 89.
418. Id.
419. The Territory is divided into 7 districts: (1) Marshall Island District, (2)
Palau District, (3) Ponape District, (4) Rota District, (5) Saipan District, (6)
Truk District, and (7) Yap District. The islands comprising the Trust Territory
are scattered in clusters over the vast expanse of the Western Pacific Ocean.
The 2,141 individual land areas within the Trust Territory comprise ninetyseven distinct island units grouped in three archipelagos, the Marianas, the
Carolines and the Marshalls. To these, early explorers gave the name
"Micronesia" (Tiny Isles). Micronesia, which covers a combined land area of
only 687 square miles, is scattered over some 3 million square miles of ocean.
North and south it extends 1,300 miles from Farallon de Pajaros at the upper
tip of the Mariana chain downwards to Kapingamarangi Atoll in the Caroline
Islands, while east and west it spreads over approximately 2,765 land miles
from Mili Atoll in Marshall Islands to Tobi in the Western Carolines. At its
center, Micronesia is some 3,500 miles west of Honolulu and 1,500 miles east
of Manila.
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, NINTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON THE
ADMINISTRATIONOFTHETRUSTTERRITORYOFTHEPACIACISLANDS (1956).
420. See also COULTER, supra note 406, at 291.
The Marshall Islands can truly be called the ends of the earth, for each day
begins at the 180th meridian a little east of them, and they are among the last
islands in the world to see its close ... they consist of thirty-four low-lying
coral atolls and single islands arranged roughly in two parallel chains running
from north-northwest to south-southeast. The easternmost row, called the
Radak ('towards the dawn') Chain, comprises fourteen atolls and two single
islands. The westernmost row, called the Ralik ('towards the sunset') Chain, is
composed of fifteen atolls and three single islands. Two of the northern atolls
of the Ralik Chain, Eniwetok and Ujeland, lie somewhat out of line to the
westward, and so isolated from the rest that the Japanese used to administer
them from Ponagpe in the Eastern Carolines rather than with the rest of the
Marshalls.
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Caroline Islands are between the Marshall Islands and the Philippines.
The five large island groups are Kusaie, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and
Palau.422 The Mariana Islands are north of Guam. Like Guam, they are
home to the indigenous Chamorro people. They are comprised of fifteen
islands that include Saipan, Rota, Tinian, Aguijan, and Farallon de
Medinilla.423
Spain took control of the islands in the late 1600s and encountered
numerous problems with imposing Christianity on the inhabitants of the
islands.424 By at least one account, Spain was responsible for reducing
the population of one group, "the Chamorros of the Mariana Islands,
from 50,000 in the 17th century to 4,000 by the early 18th centycy."425
In 1885, Germany seized control of the Marianas from Spain.426 The
United States later, in 1898, acquired the Phillippines and Guam after
the Spainish-American War.427 Germany then purchased the remaining
islands from Spain in 1899.428 Japan seized German holdings at the
outbreak of World War I, and later administered the islands "under a
League of Nations Mandate."429 Japan is credited with developing the
territory extensively, "particularly in the production of agricultural and
fishery products. Large and flourishing Japanese communities were
built, complete with the necessary roads and other public works facilities."430
Finally, the United States captured the islands during World War II, and
continues to administer the islands under the United Nations Trusteeship
system.431 Since the end of World War II, the United States has
maintained a ''unique relationship',432 with a group of islands in the Pacific
known as Micronesia. However, the majority of Americans are not aware
of these "members of the American family."~33 The prevalent perception
Id. This is significant because when nuclear testing was conducted on Eniwetok, the
inhabitants were placed on Ujelang. D. Michael Green, America's Trusteeship Dilemma
and its Humanitarian Obligations, 9 TEx. INT'LL.J. 19, 34 (1974).
421. See COULTER, supra note 406, at 187.
422. Id. at 179.
423. Id. at 162.
424. McHENRY, supra note 416, at 5.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. See generally McKibben, supra note 271, at 259.
433. Justice White coined the term "American Family'' when he created the
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has been described:
How is one to become concerned about a people so limited in numbers that they
could be fitted into the Rose Bowl,434 though they are scattered over an ocean
area the size of the United States? With all our problems at home and abroad,
how can we worry about a hundred thousand lotus eaters on their picturesque
atolls435 which total only 700 square miles. 436

In the case of Micronesia, the remoteness of these islands enables the
United States international policy to fester. The subordinate status of
these people is in no small part a product of American xenophobia. 437
This mindset contradicts the doctrine of equality of citizenship438 that is
the fruit of our American heritage. The treatment of these people is
grounded in the belief that the "territories [of Micronesia are] inhabited
by backward and underprivileged people."439 The term "lotus eaters"440
captures this sentiment. "(F]or years, Washington judged the islanders
[of Micronesia], because of their color441 and culture, too backward to
categories of territories. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339-42 (1901).
434. Given the increased population growth since 1969, the inhabitants of
Micronesia would now exceed the capacity of this collegiate stadium. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2000, at 879 (1999).
435. "The atolls are, in the main, typical coral atolls, ordinarily consisting of an oval
or irregular ring of small islets surrounding a lagoon. They include the two largest atolls
in the world, Kwajalein and Namonuito." COULTER, supra note 406, at 164.
436. Philip W. Quigg, Coming of Age in Micronesia, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 493, 493
(1969).
437. Xenophobia is a "fear and hatred of strangers or foreigners or of anything that
is strange or foreign." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2644 (1986).
438. "Accordingly, the doctrine [of equal citizenship] 'forbids the organized society
to treat people as members of an inferior or dependent caste, or as non-participants."'
Roman, supra note 8, at 5 (quoting Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and
Marginality, 30 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1, 1 (1988)).
439. Francis B. Sayre, Legal Problems Arising from the United Nations Trusteeship
System, 42 AM J. INT'L L. 263, 263 (1948). It should be noted that the author, Sayre,
while not expressing the official views of the United States Government, was the United
States Representative in the Trusteeship Council, President of the Council, and Alternate
United States Representative to the Second Session of the General Assembly. Id.
440. The term "lotus-eaters" refers to Homer's The Odyssey. In this Greek myth,
Odysseus on his journey found a group of people in a state of 'lethargic forgetfulness'
induced by their constant meal of lotus. The term has hence been used to describe
indolent, dreamy and fruitless people. See Odyssey, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 64142 (Grolier Inc. 1993); see also COULTER, supra note 406, at 347.
Life for most of these attractive, brown-skinned Micronesian peoples is simple
and primitive. . . . Few natives today seek a change which involves any
particular effort on their part for, free from individual poverty or want, they
prefer the idle, happy life which they have always known. They do not wish
increased economic returns at the price of hard work. They regard their way of
living as superior to ours.
Id.
441. See COULTER, supra note 406, at 169.
Physically the average Micronesian is of medium stature-five feet four inches
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rule themselves."442 Today, the United States contends that Micronesia
is free and sovereign.443
At the end of the First World War ... President Woodrow Wilson, in his
address of February 11, 1918, declared that "peoples and provinces are not to be
bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and
pawns in a game ... but every territorial settlement involved in this war must be
made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned... .'>444

Yet, at the San Francisco conference after World War II "[t]he United
States demanded that the Trust Territory be designated a strategic area
under the supervision of the United Nations Security Council. This was
unprecedented.',445 It was possible because, "[o]n a global scale, the United
States had a tremendous amount of influence in shaping the post war
global reality. . . . [T]he United States [succeeded because it had] made
it a priority to neutralize Micronesia as a strategic threat to the United
States." 446 In fact, at least one writer has reported that the CIA had a
twenty-eight million dollar base on the Island of Saipan that was used
between 1951 and 1962 for training Chinese nationalists. 447 The
presence of this base, of course, meant restricting entry into the Mariana
Islands for security reasons.448 This, in effect, "meant closing Micronesia, for
the Marianas were Micronesia's port of entry, its most immediate link to

to five inches for the males-with brown skin, straight to wavy hair, relatively
little face and body hair, and rather high cheekbones. People in the western
and central district-Palau, Ponape, and Truk-tend to have slight Mongoloid
characteristics. By contrast, those in the Marshalls to the east resemble
somewhat their Polynesian neighbors, with longer and narrower hands and
faces and narrower noses and lips. Of these various combinations, which
characterize the island groups, there are many examples of intermediate
mixtures.
Id.; see also id. at 296 ("The Marshallese, somewhat like the Polynesians in racial
characteristics, in general have brown skins slightly darker than those of the Samoans.
Most of them have straight black hair; the hair of the others ranges from wavy to
curly.'').
442. The "[i]slands in the group known as the Marshalls were discovered by Spain
in 1529.'' COULTER, supra note 406, at 170.
443. See S.C. Res. 683, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2792d mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.
2792 (1990); see also S.C. Res. 683, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Supp., at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/683 (1990).
444. Sayre, supra note 439, at 264.
445. McKibben, supra note 271, at 267.
446. Hyun S. Lee, Post Trusteeship Environmental Accountability: Case of PCB
Contamination on the Marshall Islands, 26 DENV. J. lNT'LL. & PoL'Y399, 403 (1998).
447. McHENRY, supra note 416, at 57.
448. Id.
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the outside. Under these circumstances, efforts at economic development
through tourism there or elsewhere were hamstrung." 449
Thus, the United States had "virtually unlimited power in Micronesia
for as long as it wishe[d]-although such is not the objective spelled out
therein."450 Under article 6 of the Trusteeship Agreement, the United
States had the duty to
foster the development of such political institutions as are suited to the Trust
Territory and shall promote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the
particular circumstances of the Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; and to this end shall give to the
inhabitants of the Trust Territory a progressively increasing share in the
administrative services in the Territory; shall develop their participation in
government; shall give due recognition to the customs of the inhabitants in
providing a system of law for the Territory; and shall take other appropriate
measures toward these ends. 451
Furthermore, the agreement declares, the United States must "promote the
economic advancement and self-sufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end
shall regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the development of
fisheries, agriculture and industries; protect the inhabitants against the loss of
their lands and resources; and improve the means of transportation and
communication." 452

The United States' disregard for Micronesian wishes further confirmed
that the right to self-determination for the citizens of the Trust Territory
was "mockery."453 Similar to the scenerio faced by post-SpanishAmerican War acquisitions of Guam and Puerto Rico, the United States'
approach towards Micronesia was based on the fact that the people of
Micronesia "have no alternative between abysmal poverty in independence
and being steamrollered into something they do not want to be by a
well-meaning but heavy-handed America. " 454 And while economic
dependence was an everyday factor in Micronesia life, those
who realize that independence is not economically feasible ... assert[ed] that
"only if we are independent will we be able to negotiate with you Americans as
equals. Basically, our real estate is all you want and all we have to sell [read
'lease'] and we're determined to get a fair price for it." 455

The economic dependency of the region was of concern to the United
Nations when it reprimanded the United States because "[n]o precise
goals to be achieved over a given period in the field of the Territory's
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
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Id.
Mink, supra note 6, at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 183-84.
Quigg, supra note 436, at 505.
Id. at 508 (emphasis added).
Id. at 503.
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economic advancement have been laid down by the Administration; and
there is no co-ordinated plan for economic development.',456 ''The Mission
is convinced that a definite, urgent and well co-ordinated effort is called
for immediately to revitalize the Territory's economy in general and to
expand the scope of economic activity." 457
The Mission [saw] no reason to delay the introduction of a well-planned
long-term development programme on the ground that [the] people are not
ready for it; they are not only ready for such a programme, but, for the most
part, are already somewhat impatient. In commerce and in related fields where
techniques can be easily acquired, Micronesians, with the requisite assistance,
have proven their ability and capacity.458

But economic dependency was not an accidental byproduct of the
American administration. The policy was that "[a]s long as Micronesia
remains economically dependent on the United States, the United States
laws and policies [would] be influential."459 Anthony M. Solomon, the
Chainnan of President Kennedy's survey team, visited the islands in 1963
and wrote a report concerning United States financial aid to Micronesia.
''The thrust of The Solomon Report is that by increasing United States
financial aid, loyalty of the Trust Territory will be assured via the
resultant economic dependency." 460 In April of 1971, a group of
Micronesian students at the University of Hawaii obtained the Solomon
Report and distributed it. The Young Micronesian described the
recommendations as "a ruthless five-year plan to systematically
Americanize Micronesia into a permanent association in clear and
conscious defiance of its trusteeship obligations.',461 While the United
States' bureaucracy delayed and argued about holding a plebiscite, the
Micronesians, "despairing of ever seeing a United States status
commission, took matters into their own hands and created their own
status commission."462 However, "all the delay had its impact on the
Micronesians too, for the longer they waited, the more dependent they
became on United States money and the more difficult it was for them to
456. Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, 1961, U.N. TCOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 19 (1961) [hereinafter
U.N. 1961].
457. Id. at 13.
458. Id. at 20.
459. Metelski, supra note 6, at 182. Metelski's article argues that the United States
should use its economic influence to forge a unified Micronesia. See generally id.
460. Id. at 165 n.17.
461. McHENRY, supra note 416, at 19.
462. Id. at 23.
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consider going it alone as an independent country."463
"The Marshallese eventually adopted their own Constitution in 1979.
The principles of free association established in 1978 led to fruition in
1982 with the signing of the Compact of Free Association." 464 The
Commonwealth status of the Northern Marianas is also currently an
issue. The Northern Marianas' disagreement with the United States
stems from interpretation of its negotiated and approved agreement.
While the Northern Marianas had allegedly been guaranteed
self-government, the United States has taken steps to control internal
matters, leading the Northern Marianas to appeal both in the United
States and to the United Nations Security Council.465
In exchange for the United States' continued presence in Micronesia,
the islands would remain under the economic mantle of Washington.
This trade off verifies the observation of Edmund Burke, that "[t]he
people never give up their liberties but under some delusion." 466 In the
case of Micronesia, the delusion was autonomy and economic stability.
Thus, in response to the United Nation's condemnation of United States
administration of the territories, the United States provided a modicum
of autonomy by allowing the territories to organize governments and
establish constitutions. This went hand in hand with the status induction
of these quasi-sovereigns as freely associated states and commonwealths.
However, while accepted by the United Nations as a state of autonomy,
compact status has been criticized as being a progression toward, but not
a realization of self-deterrnination. 467
This criticism is vindicated by the United States' postcompact relations
with the "nations" of Micronesia. In 1986, the United States signed and
implemented Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. 468 The Compacts
of Free Association are joint congressional executive agreements that are
463. Id. at 24.
464. In the intervening twelve years since the Compact was implemented, the
Marshall Islands have seen a large number of cancer cases. Giff Johnson, Study Calls
Marshall Islands' Cancer Rate Extreme, PAC. ISLANDS REP., Mar, 22, 1999, at
http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/a230399b.htm. A Nuclear Claims Tribunal awarded
more than a half billion dollars to the Bikinians in 2001 "for damages done to their
islands and their people during the nuclear testing on Bikini." Bikini Atoll: Reparations
for Damages, at http://www.bikiniatoll.com/repar. html (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
465. See generally Victoria King, Comment, The Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands' Rights Under United States and International Law to Control Its
Exclusive Economic Zone, 13 U. HAW. L. REv. 477 (1991).
466. THE GREAT THOUGHTS 59 (George Seldes, compiler) (1985).
467. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1161. While discussing the compact status
of Puerto Rico, the concept that United Nations recognition does not beget autonomy is
equally applicable to the status of Micronesia.
468. Arthur John Armstrong & Howard Loomis Hills, The Negotiations for the
Future Political Status of Micronesia ([980-1984), 78 AM. J. INT'LL. 484,485 (1984).
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classified as unilateral treaties, in which the United States is granted
exclusive military use of the territory belonging to the other party in
exchange for United States economic aid.469 However, even if this trade
off were to be free of economic duress, the agreement would still be
invalid because the compact status do_es not provide the economic stability
it promises in that it is only for a limited term.470 The agreement also
attempts to circumvent colonialism by claiming that the other party has
the right to conduct foreign relations. However, this right is limited in
that exercise in autonomy is subject to United States approval.471
Another example of the lack of autonomy of these countries is that, in
1986, President Reagan declared that the trusteeship was no longer in
effect in Micronesia, the Marshalls, and the Northern Marshalls, but
continued for Palau.472 Yet, years later, the United States informed the
United Nations that the trusteeships remained in effect.473 Nevertheless,
the compacts with Micronesia were accepted by the United Nations as
granting autonomy and replacing the trust, which the Reagan
Administration had terminated.474
As pointed out by former United Nations Ambassador Donald McHenry:
"We in a sense almost made them [the Micronesians] a welfare state."475
"'We served them poorly,' said McHenry ... '[w]e educated people to
be political scientists and to sit behind a desk, not to grow tropical fruit
and fish .... We created a dependency."'476
But upon examination, this new status of each land is akin to the colonial
relationship described earlier. Much like the post-Spanish-American
War possessions:
"The parent state alone ... possesses [the] international personality and has the
capacity to exercise international rights and duties." The parent state ...
grant[s] or bestow[s] upon its colony a degree of internal autonomy and even
grants autonomy over certain external affairs. These rights, however, are
generally considered revocable at the discretion of the parent state.477

469. McKibben, supra note 271, at 274.
470. Id. at 274-75.
471. Id.
472. See Trask, supra note 253, at 8.
473. Id.
474. 135 CONG. REC. H9626-03, H9628 (daily ed. May 18, 1989).
475. 137 CONG. REC. E871, E872 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1991) (statement of Hon. Eni
F. H. Falemavaega) (quoting Doug J. Swanson & Ed Timms, American Empire: The
U.S. Territories, HONOLULU STAR BULL. & ADVERTISER, Sept. 23, 1990).
476. Id.
477. Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 1137-38 (quoting ROBERTD. JENNINGS &
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As one writer observed: "Beyond [Palau], the long-negotiated covenants
with the Northern Marianas, the Marshalls, and the Federated States of
Micronesia (FSM) reveal that full decolonization has not occurred,"
particularly in light of the United States' right to maintain permanent
military powers in these areas. 478
Therefore, irrespective of their new labels, these territories are still
neocolonial possessions of the United States. The extent of this cloaked
dominion can best be demonstrated by the struggle between the United
States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.
B. The Marshall Islands
The Republic of the Marshall Islands is composed of approximately 58,000
people living on twenty-nine coral atolls and islands in the Pacific.479 The
Marshall Islands entered into the Compact of Free Association with the
United States in 1986.480
The United States Marshall Islands, like Palau and Micronesia, was
obtained by the United States as part of the U.N. Trusteeship Agreement.
"Under United States governance, Marshall Islands life has been
dominated by the activities of the U.S. military, revolving about the
continued use of Kwajalein as a missile testing ground and the
continuing bitterness and lawsuits as a result of the U.S. atomic tests
from 1946 to 1958."481
The clash between the United States' security and the best interests of
the indigenous people occurred early in the trusteeship's history. 482 The
most telling example of the United States "concern" for the Micronesians is
the nuclear testing that the United States conducted on the Marshall
Islands. It demonstrates that the United States "presence [in Micronesia
was] ... motivated more by our military needs in the Pacific than by
genuine humanitarian concern."483
During the summer of 1946, one full year before the trusteeship's
inception, the recently established Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
initiated experimentation in nuclear fission at Bikini Atoll in the Marshalls
ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM's INTERNATIONAL LAW 275-76 (9th ed. 1993)).
478. Trask, supra note 253, at 8.
479. See RMI Embassy, USA, Marshall Island General Information for Visitors, at
http://www.rmiembassyus.org/tourinfo.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
480. See RMI Embassy, USA, RMI Historical Chronology, at http://www.
rmiembassyus.org/hischron. html (last visited Oct. 28, 2001).
481. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 601.
482. Green, supra note 420, at 33 ("The United States Delegation Chairman's
post-conference assertion to President Truman that native interests could be preserved
while safeguarding the administrating Power's security objectives seems far-fetched on
its face, and as future events unfolded, unrealistic as well.").
483. Mink, supra note 6, at 185.
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with naval cooperation. The experimentation "requir[ed] dislocation of
one hundred sixteen residents to Kili, an unsuitable island far to the
south where they experienced environmental di:fficulties."484 These hydrogen
bomb experiments, known as "Operation Crossroads," 485 "involved [the
transfer of] 167 people in Bikini Atoll."486 According to the United
Nations, "[t]he Bikini people agreed to place their atoll at the disposal of
the United States Government as a site for experiments in nuclear fission
and to be resettled elsewhere."487 However, the natives who had their
land taken for the construction of naval bases contend that there was no
consent involved in United States' relocation. They note:
Within a few days after the landings [of U.S. troops,] our people were evacuated
from their villages on Mogmog, Asoer, Falalop, Potongros, and Soden Islands
and put on Fassarai Island on the opposite side of the lagoon. . . . They did not
understand what was going to happen, and they did not know how long they
would be away.488

The people of Bikini supposedly agreed:
Rongerik atoll, to which they were transferred, proved inadequate to support
them and they were temporarily transferred to Kwajalein and then permanently
settled on the island of Kili. Bikini had an extensive lagoon with good
anchorage for ships and much greater land area than Kili, to which sea
communications are difficult as it has no lagoon or anchorage for ships. Kili,
however, is in the south, with much heavier rainfall and richer soil than Bikini.
Here there are no extensive reefs and lagoons to furnish an abundance of fish,
and the cultivation of food plants, which did not exist on Bikini, must be
learned.489

Meanwhile:
In 1947, by executive agreement and with the approval of Congress, the United
484. Green, supra note 420, at 34.
485. Lee, supra note 446, at 405 ("The very first of these hydrogen bomb
experiments took place on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in 1946. The experiments
that took place in 1946 were referred to as 'Operation Crossroads."').
486. U.N. 1961, supra note 456, at 33.
487. Report on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR Visiting
Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 2, at 14, U.N. Doc. T/897
(1951) [hereinafter U.N. 1951].
488. Mink, supra note 6, at 188 (quoting a Letter from Yap Outer Island Students at
the University of Guam to Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, and member of the
foreign affairs committee (Sept. 13, 1970)).
489. U.N. 1951, supra note 487, at 14; see also Report on the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific, 1956,
18th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 26, U.N. Doc. T/1278 (1956) [hereinafter U.N. 1956]
(reporting that the attempt to move them from Kili to Jaluit was unsuccessful).
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States entered into the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations. The
President's authority over foreign affairs, which derives from the executive
treatymaking power in the United States Constitution, provided the source of
power. Together with the United Nations Charter, the Trusteeship Agreement,
which is an international treaty and a bilateral contract between the United
States and the Security Council, dictates the terms of the trusteeship."490

On July 23, 1947, five days after the trusteeship agreement became
effective, the AEC established its Pacific Proving Ground, declaring
later that year its selection of Eniwetok Atoll for further experimental
detonation of nuclear armament. 491 "The Atomic Energy Commission
justified its choice of Enewetak Atoll and the resettlement of its inhabitants,
on the basis that it had the fewest inhabitants and 'it [was] isolated and
there [were] hundreds of miles of open seas in the direction in which
winds might carry radioactive particles."'492 Subsequently, "[t]he
second displacement involving the 137 inhabitants of Eniweitok Atoll"
took place. The agency resettled the inhabitants on the Marshallese atoll
of Ujelang. 493
The third transfer took place in 1954 when the people of Uterik and
Rongelap were affected by radioactive fallout494 from the tests held during
that year. Immediately following the incident, "154 people living on
Uterik and 82 living on Rongelap were transferred to other islands."495
The fallout was caused by "an unexpected shift of the prevailing winds
over Bikini Atoll which carried radioactive fallout from a hydrogen
device exploded there in 1954 to the neighboring atolls of Rongerik,
Rongelap, and Utrik.496 The test explosion's magnitude was underestimated
by a factor of one half. 497
The Uterik people, who were less affected by the radiation, were
returned to their home island during 1954 after the Administration
declared that the island was safe from radioactive contamination. The
people of Rongelap, who were more heavily exposed to radiation,
returned to their home island in June 1957 from Ejit island in the Majuro
Atoll, where they were taken care of by the Administration from the time
of their transfer until their return. 498 However, later, the administration
490. McKibben, supra note 271, at 265-66.
491. Green, supra note 420, at 34.
492. Lee, supra note 446, at 406 (quoting Press Release No. 70, The Atomic Energy
Commission (Dec. 1, 1947)).
493. Green, supra note 420, at 34.
494. "This thermonuclear accident exposed two hundred thirty-six Marshallese
residents of the three atolls and twenty-three crew members of an adjacent fishing vessel,
Fukuryu Maru (Me Lucky Dragon)." Green, supra note 420, at 35.
495. U.N. 1961, supra note 456, at 33.
496. Green, supra note 420, at 34.
497. Id. at 34-35.
498. U.N. 1961, supra note 456, at 3.
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changed its conclusion regarding the safety of the islands and, since
"Rongelab and Uterik are now radioactive, their inhabitants are being
kept on Kwajalein499 for an indeterminate length of time."500 Sadly, the
people of the islands
were well acquainted with the United States attitude toward the use of Trust
Territory land, in the forced evacuations in the Marshall Islands, such as that of
Bikini atoll, Eniwetok, and Kwajalein to allow their use for nuclear weapons
and missile testing. These uses were classic examples of colonialism-unjust
and poorly compensated seizure of land, and inept and insensitive resettlement
of the population. Families were taken off their native lands, paid paltry sums
and put on remote islands which were so different from their own that it often
required an entire change in their life style; from highly arable land to an area so
barren that nothing could grow, or from an island rich in inshore fisheries to one
which required deep sea fishing because it lacked a reef.SOI

Finally, in 1954, a thermonuclear explosion on Bikini resulted in injury to
at least 249 Marshallese, and further, has resulted in cases of thyroid
cancer and leukemia.502 Though the extent of injury is still unknown,
the United States set up a fund of $150 million to compensate all those
injured by nuclear testing. The $150 million limit on the fund has been
challenged and the challenge rejected by U.S. courts stating: "[T]he
executive's power to extinguish claims before the courts through espousal
and settlement has been held to be a valid exercise of the foreign
relations power."503
Although "[t]he sole connecting link between the peoples of the
various groups [in Micronesia] is the control of the United States
Government as Administrating Authority,"504 the United States was
determined to create a federation in Micronesia. This plan of
Micronesian unification was the only manifestation of self-determination
that the United States was willing to accept. It was a concept that the
Micronesians repudiated.
In a petition to the United Nations visiting mission, the people of the
Marshall islands noted:
We understand and appreciate the American ideal of "One People" but we
are a separate country from Ponape with our own separate customs and culture
499. The island of KawaJalein is only used by the military. See Lee, supra note
446, at 407.
500. Lee, supra note 446, at 407.
501. Mink, supra note 6, at 196.
502. LEIBOWTIZ, supra note 7, at 603.
503. Id. at 604.
504. U.N. 1951, supra note 487, at 2 (emphasis added).
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and language and have no more desire to be classed with or merged with the
Ponapeans than France has desire to merge with Germany or China with Japan.
We feel that it is unfair to us as a people to be lumped together with other
groups of Micronesian peoples as one people. We are proud of our race and our
heritage and resent and fear any attempt to merge us culturally or otherwise with
other peoples with the resultant loss of our own culture and individuality. 505

The administration ignored the fact that "since the inhabitants of each
island group are proud of their language, history, and culture, they resist
being intepated politically and socially with the members of the other
groups."5
From the western perspective, these people were all the
same. Democracy was only relevant in that the Micronesians might
"gain political experience which will serve them well if and when a
common Micronesian government becomes a practical possibility."507
The idea of a unified Micronesia was diametrically opposed to the
desires of the Micronesian people and the people of the Marshall Islands.
The only unification that the people desired was with Guam and it was
denied because it was not what the United States had planned for
Micronesia. The people of the Northern Marianas noted:

°

It is our fervent hope that all of the islands of the Northern Marianas be
incorporated into the United States of America either as a possession or as a
territory, preferably as a territory. It is our desire that someday these islands
may be considered a part of the United States and its people attain American
citizenship. sos

American citizenship was desired because
the people of Guam are to be accorded American citizenship and that that island
is to become a Territory of the United States. Inasmuch as all of these islands
are of the same Island Group, and inasmuch as we are socially, culturally,
biologically, geographically, economically and politically associated with Guam
and the Guamanians, we feel that such close ties would justify our request to the
Congress of the United States. 509

Ironically, while disregarding the Micronesian and Marshallese pleas,
the United Nations recognized that "the people of the Trust Territory are
ready to choose their future [regarding] the form of self-government or
independence."510 They observed "that throughout [the negotiations],
the Micronesians have exhibited an intelligent and capable approach in

505. Letter to the United Nations Visiting Mission 3 (Feb. 18, 1953) (on file with
author).
506. COULTER, supra note 406, at 349.
507. U.N. Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific: Report on the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, U.N. TCOR, 12th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 7, U.N. Doc.
T/1077 (1953).
508. U.N. 1951, supra note 487, at 19.
509. Id.
510. U.N. 1961, supra note 456, at 11.
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their negotiating position."511 They further noted that "the people of the
Territory are already willing, enthusiastic and capable of undertaking
programmes[,] provided the necessary funds and technical assistance are
made available."512
Nevertheless, the United States' dereliction towards Micronesian selfdetermination was not moved by these observations because it was not
based on their ability or comprehension of the democratic process. The
United States judged the Micronesians by race, not by their actions.
Yet, Micronesian self-determination could not, despite our bigotry, be
ignored in perpetuity. "In 1966 the Congress of Micronesia passed a
petition requesting that President Johnson establish a commission 'to
consult the people of Micronesia and to ascertain their wishes and views
and to study and critically assess the political alternatives open to
Micronesia."513 "In 1967 the President 'complied' with the Micronesian
request by asking the United States Congress to authorize a Status
Commission with the ultimate objective of staging a plebiscite among
the people by June 30, 1972. This Commission was to have eight
Presidentially-appointed members."514 However, the "Legislation to
establish the Presidential Commission fortunately never passed the U.S.
Congress."515
The United States Congress established a Future Political Status
Commission to identify and report on the political options for Micronesia
The Commission submitted two reports. The first, in 1968, discussed
alternatives without making a recommendation. The second, in 1969,
recommended that Micronesia become self-governing and associated
freely with the United States or, in the alternative, that it become
independent.516 However, the United States had already committed itself
to bringing the trust territory into a permanent relationship with the
United States.517 In 1969, notwithstanding the Commission's recommendation,
511. Metelski, supra note 6, at 169.
512. U.N. 1961, supra note 456, at 19.
513. Mink, supra note 6, at 198.
514. Id. at 199.
515. Id.
516. McKibben, supra note 271, at 270.
517. A widespread view in Washington, especially in the Defense Department,
is that independence is not a realistic option and that it would therefore be
dishonest to offer it. The State Department rightly points out that we are
legally obligated by treaty with the United Nations to offer the alternative of
independence, and that the U.N. will insist upon it, however impractical.
Quigg, supra note 436, at 503.
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the United States offered to make Micronesia a territory pursuant to the
Territorial Clause. The Congress of Micronesia rejected this offer, as it
did the following year's offer of commonwealth status. 518 The question
is, therefore, similar to other territories of the United States-whether
the people of Micronesia will be given a meaningful choice. That is,
"will the plebiscites be valid as an expression of the wishes of the people
if they contain only the alternatives of accepting or rejecting the package
presented them by the negotiators?"519 These proposals produced a
response from Micronesian Senator Salii that aptly expresses the
analysis here pertaining to all United States island territories.
I have always thought that Micronesia belonged to Micronesians and that
the Micronesians had the right to rule their home islands. / have never believed
that the fact that other nations fought wars in our islands and waters and
negotiated agreements, mandates, trusteeships among themselves when they
were finished fighting ever affected the fact that we were Micronesians and this
was our home . . . . The commonwealth status would make us a [permanent part
of the United States] political family. But we are Micronesians and not
Americans. We can be friends of America as America indeed has sometimes
befriended us. But what is being offered to us is not friendship and it is not
partnership. It is ownership, friendly ownership for the time being, but
ownership nonetheless.520

Thus, the Marshallese experience with the United States under the
United Nations Trusteeship Agreement has been dismal at times, and the
nuclear testing which took place there continues to affect people's lives
today.
C. Palau

521

Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia are located in the Pacific
approximately 4450 miles southwest of Hawaii. 522 Palau is composed of
518. McKibben, supra note 271, at 270-71.
The approach of the United States delegation was essentially to present a
blueprint offer of traditional Commonwealth status. The Micronesian
Delegation, on the other hand, set forth certain principles it desired to
negotiate. The results of the talks constituted a stalemate with the United
States failing to negotiate and the Micronesians rejecting their proposals.
Metelski, supra note 6, at 168.
519. McHENRY, supra note 416, at 47.
520. Mink, supra note 6, at 203-04 (quoting remarks by Senator Lazarus Salii,
Chairman of the Political Status Delegation, Congress of Micronesia, during a Senate
debate on political status, as reported in an editorial in the Honolulu Advertiser, August
27, 1970) (emphasis added). Senator Salii became the biggest advocate of the compacts
for free association; he was also president of Palau.
521. It appears that the indigenous people of the territory refer to this land as Belau.
See Trask, supra note 253, at 1. Because verification of this difference in names is
pending, the term Palau will be used herein. No disrespect is intended to the indigenous
people.
522. Hinck, supra note 252, at 918.
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8 major, and 252 smaller islands.523 Thus, though Palau is not part of the
Federated States of Micronesia, it is located in the Pacific region known
as Micronesia 524
Also, like Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, Palau was obtained
after World War II as part of the trusteeship system of the United Nations. As
Micronesia covers an area approximately the size of the United States,
controlling the Micronesia region, including Palau, allows the United
States to essentially control the western Pacific.525 Since World War II,
the primary threat seen in the area was the expansion of the Soviet
Union, and control of the region was important to preventing the former
U.S.S.R. from expanding.526
Much of Micronesia, including Palau, was a major battle field during World
War II. During the war, the United States seized all islands previously under
Japanese control, incurring high civilian and troop casualties. Given the high
cost of liberating Micronesia and given its strategic location, some inside the
U.S. government called for the outright annexation of the islands in the interest
of national security.527

However, Dwight D. Eisenhower had this to say about Palau and Micronesia:
We have here islands that in many instances are nothing but sandspits. They are
of very little economic value. Our sole interest in them is security. But they are
the spots on that great ocean surface that to-day provide a capacity and an
ability for a nation that would seek to conduct aggressive operations across that
ocean. They would have to use them. So long as we have them, they can't use
them, and that means to me, even in their negative denial to someone else, a
tremendous step forward in the security of this country. 528

Because Palau and the Trust Territories were strategic in nature, the
United States could "close areas for reasons of security, prohibit U.N.
supervision, erect bases and fortify the islands, exclude American nationals,
companies and associations from the restrictions of the most favored
nation clause, and control aircraft traffic rights."529 Today, Palau is still
an important strategic area for the United States. Palau is near major shipping
routes, and is commonly thought to be a "likely fall-back position if the
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 919.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 919-20.
528. LEIBOWTIZ, supra note 7, at 487 (quoting Hearing on S. Res. 143 Before the
Senate Comm on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong. 18 (1947) (statement of Dwight D.
Eisenhower, General of the Anny Chief of Staff)).
529. Id. at 488.
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United States is ever displaced from its two ... military bases in the
Philippines. " 53 Furthermore, the islands of Palau "have exploitable
mineral deposits (phosphate and gold) and a coral shelf which is an
internationally famous diving attraction."531 Furthermore, though the
Republic of Palau is certainly more economically secure than most of
Micronesia, the competitive nature of the politics in Palau has led to a
struggle between Palau and the United States. 532
Palau has also been treated in much the same manner as Micronesia
and the Marshall Islands. "During the early years of the trusteeship, political
and economic development progressed slowly in the Trust Territory."533
However, during the sixties, Palau began to make the journey to selfdetermination.534 Palau, along with the other trust territories, held a
constitutional convention. 535 and attempted to pass its own constitution
in 1975. Unfortunately, "[t]he three-quarters majority [required by the
Palauan Constitution to ratify a free association agreement with the U.S.]
has been impossible to obtain to date." 536 In fact, there has been a
constant struggle between Palau and the United States regarding certain
clauses in the proposed constitutions. 537 The Palauans wanted a
"nuclear-free constitution" that would not allow nuclear weapons inside
the territorial boundaries of Palau, and further, opposes the selling of
land to foreign entities. 538 The nuclear free constitution was opposed by
the United States, which insisted that their naval operations be excluded
from the constitutional ban. One authority on the subject noted that after
several referenda results demonstrated the Palauan refusal to change
their constitution, the political crisis escalated into violence. 539 One
Palauan president was assassinated, one committed suicide, and some
activists were killed. 540 The United States completed negotiations with
the Republic of Palau on August 26, 1982.541
The several failed attempts at reaching an agreement between the
United States and Palau resulted in a 1985 compact, which was
beneficial to United States interests. 542 The Compact was approved by
Congress and signed by President Reagan in 1986; however, it was not

°
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532.
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534.
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Hinck, supra note 252, at 919.
LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 622.
Id. at 622-23.
Hinck, supra note 252, at 922-23.
Id. at 921.
Id.
LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 623.
See generally Hinck, supra note 252.
Id. at 923-25.
Trask, supra note 253, at 7.
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H.R. REP. No. 188, at 3 ( 1987).
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actually implemented until 1994.543 The delay was a result of conflict,
which existed between the compact and Palau's constitution. 544 The
compact requires the United States to not use Palau for nuclear
purposes, including storing nuclear weapons in Palauan territory. 545
The United States could send its nuclear ships to the territory. 546
Because the agreement did not receive the seventy-five percent needed
for approval under the Palauan Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Palau invalidated the compact, but in 1994, it was implemented by the
United States.547
The constitutional struggle in Palau has also resulted in economic strife for
the small nation.548 One writer notes a U.S. General Accounting Office
report on the conflict, which found that from August 1985 to August 1988,
the Reagan Administration was involved in the territory's economic
wars. 549 According to this depiction of the report, the United States
government refused to monitor expenditure of federal funds in the
territory, overlooked serious charges of intimidation and reprisals against
Palauans opposed to the compact, and actually "encouraged the economic
deterioration and political chaos in Balau [the name indigenous people
use for the territory] in the hopes that such a climate would be favorable
to passage of the compact."550
Palau and the Marshall Islands had specifically rejected
commonwealth status as offered by the United States. 551 Palau,
instead, "sought and obtained the status of a Freely Associated State"
(FAS).ss2
It is believed that there are four major distinctions to be made between a
commonwealth and a FAS.553 A FAS may be distinguished from a
commonwealth by:
(1) unilateral ability of the FAS to end the relationship; (2) the lack of U.S.
citizenship of the FAS residents; (3) the capacity of the FAS to engage in world

543.
Islands,
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.

William Branigin, Independence for Palau Ends U.S. Sovereignty over Pacific
WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at A30.
135 CONG. REC. H9626-03, H9628 (daily ed.
LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 624--25.

May 18, 1989).

Id. at 625.
Branigin, supra note 543, at A30.
Trask, supra note 253, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id.
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affairs as an international sovereign with very limited restraint; and (4) the
capacity in the FAS to have one's own fiscal and monetary system. 554

Notwithstanding these distinctions, the level of subordination of the
people of Palau is demonstrated in a petition asking, ''that the manufactur[ing
of] alcoholic beverages be forbidden in Palau."555 The Palauans began
their plea as follows:
We, the people of Palau, are still very handicapped in body and soul because
we lack many things in our country....
And so, now for the second time, we ask the Americans who govern us to
listen to our plea, for we are foresaken [sic]. There is no peace in the houses
where there is drinking. 556

Similarly the Micronesians of Saipan carefully stated in their petition:
We are indeed grateful for the generous aid which we have received from the
United States Government since the capture of Saipan in 1944 by American
Forces. In mentioning these problems we in no way wish to disparage the
continuing efforts of the United States Navy Civil Administration in our behalf.
We appreciate greatly the help that the Civil Administration has given us. We
do wish to emphasize, however, that the problems outlined below must be
solved if the people of Saipan are to build a sound economy in the future, and if
we are to provide for the welfare of our children. 557

Because of the large number of people employed by the government
(over seventy-five percent), Palau is still economically dependent on the
United States.558 The United States is also affecting the culture of Palau.
The majority of the people in Palau speak Palauan and a "high rate of
literacy is found in younger age groups today," and the young people
predominantly speak English as a second language, while older adults
554. Id.
555. UN 1951 supra note 487, at I 8.
556. Id.
557. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
558. See, e.g., Compacts of Free Association with the Marshall Islands, Federated
States of Micronesia, and Palau Joint Oversight Hearing Before the Committee on
Resources and Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International
Relations House of Representatives, 105th Cong. (1958) (statement of Hersey Kyota,
Palau Ambassador to the United States), available at http://commodocs.house.gov/
committees/resources.
Mr. Chairman, another very important issue which still remains unresolved is
the U.S. Government financial obligation to the former trust territory prior
service trust fund. The Congress, as you may be aware, appropriated initial
funding of $8 million for this program, with a remaining balance of $19
million to be appropriated later. The U.S. Government has not fulfilled this
obligation yet after numerous requests from the government of the former TPI.
The program, as you can imagine, is experiencing problems in meeting regular
payments to the beneficiaries. I understand, however, that some Members of
Congress have indicated their willingness to fulfill this obligation over a period
of several years. We welcome that, Mr. Chairman.
Id. at 64.
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speak Japanese.559 Though Japanese is necessary for economic
development in the tourism industry, English may be seen as required
for political reasons. 560
The governmental structure of the trust territory of the Pacific Islands
comprises a High Commissioner, appointed by the President of the
United States of America, a headquarters staff and a district organization
in each of the six districts which come under the jurisdiction of the
Department of the Interior (the Rota, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Marshall
Islands Districts). The High Commissioner possesses executive and
legislative powers as laid down in the code of the trust territory. The
seventh district, Saipan, is administered under the authority of the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet, at Honolulu, and
under that of the Commander of the Naval Forces in the Marians, at
Guam.s61
And yet, despite the administrative changes, the United States continued to
do "what all colonial powers have done, assumed that we knew what was
best for our wards, without much regard for their own preferences."562
On the one hand, we profess[ed] to respect and to preserve tradition and custom,
while on the other we attempt[ed] to bring to the natives that which we judge to
be best in our own culture, and which, therefore, we think must be best for
them. This frequently lead[s] ... to embarrassing situations, especially among
members of a staff who have had little or no previous experience with native
populations.563

This attitude and the later acceptance of free association with the
United States resembles a form of "colonialism by consent"564 This cultural
hegemony is evident in the Micronesian attitude towards American rule.
"The Palauans [for example,] were awed by American might. 'What do
you call these Americans who destroy all that the Japanese built and
bring the Japanese to their knees in such a short period of time?' a
Palauan asked. [Another Palauan answered,] 'You call them 'sir. "'565 It
thus may be the case, as one writer observed, ''for America's Pacific colonies,

559. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 7, at 632-33.
560. Id. at 633.
561. U.N. 1956, supra note 489, at 3.
562. Quigg, supra note 436, at 507.
563. COULTER, supra note 406, at 369.
564. See Empire Forgotten, supra note 7, at 40.
565. M.A. Farber, The Forgotten Eden, CONDE NAST TRAVELER, April 1999, at
111, 118.
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U.S. control has meant land dispossession, economic dependency,
cultural exploitation, and in many cases, death and disease." 566
VII. PROPOSALS VERSUS PROSPECTS

As this Article has demonstrated, the island territories that exist under
the United States flag all suffer from a lack of autonomy. Given their
strategic importance as well as their manageable economic cost, it
appears unlikely the United States will soon terminate its relationship
with these lands. Given the decades long failure to fully incorporate
these members of the American family, it is also unlikely the United
States will fully incorporate these lands and their people. Moreover,
given the territories' interests in maintaining their distinct identities
while at the same time continuing to be associated with the United
States, it is unlikely many will demand statehood anytime soon. Their
lands, thus, will not become states at any time in the near future. Finally,
considering the United States' increasing global influence and leadership,
it is unlikely it will be pressured into changing a relationship in a fashion
not in its own best interest. Change will likely occur only if the United
States decides that its own economic and strategic interests no longer
neccesitates the maintenance of the relationships.
The prospects for the actualization of self-determination for these
lands are bleak. The United States may eventually allow for some of the
territories to follow the paths of the federated states of Micronesia,
Palau, and the Marshall Islands and become internationally recognized
sovereign countries. However, as this Articles illustrates, recognized
sovereignty does not necessarily equate to the actualization of sovereignty.
The United States, if faced in the future with economic strife, may
perhaps be further motivated to allow more territories to become
"independent." The fact that the inhabitants of some territories, such as
Puerto Rico, already see themselves as United States citizens
considerably complicates the prospect of independence. Thus, it appears
that irrespective of title, the United States will maintain these lands and
their people within its sphere of influence.
As for the proposal this Article seeks to promote, the length and
complexity of this undertaking hopefully demonstrates the difficulty in
arriving at an easily identified solution. Century long colonial struggles
by several distinct countries and millions of their inhabitants are not
easily resolved. Nevertheless, there are certain procedural steps that can
be undertaken which may promote the realization of self-determination.

566.
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Trask, supra note 253, at 9.
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The United States should be true to its rhetoric and promote democratic
efforts in these lands to achieve autonomy. It is not enough to promote
self-determination for other powers' colonies. The subordination of
citizens and nationals is not only inconsistent with this country's
revolutionary beginning, it is also inconsistent with this country's
liberal Republican form of governance, as well as repugnant to the
country's representations concerning equality and justice. Thus, the
proposals for the beginning of a process that may lead to change are as
follows.
First, the United States, preferably by legislative act or at least by
executive order, should establish a process for the undertaking of final
binding referenda in each of the United States colonial territories. In
order to ensure that individual parties within each land do not
misrepresent the relationship with the United States, such as the
procommonwealth party has done in Puerto Rico, 567 the United States
must explicitly be involved in the electoral process by identifying
publicly and repeatedly the actual relationship between the territory
and the United States. This must include disclosure of the incorpor~ted
versus unincorporated territory dichotomy and the resulting
disenfranchisement that exists as a result of the distinction. The
agenda should also include disclosure of the nature of statutory
citizenship, including the possibility of revocability, and the difference
between independence and statehood.
Second, as commonwealth or free association was never intended to
be a final resolution to self-determination,568 the choice of a temporary
and diluted form of self-determination under free association may lead
to further ambiguity on the status issue. As the United Nations
General Assembly recognized in Resolution 1541, when it referred to
free association: "peoples . . . retain . . . the freedom to modify the
status of [the] territory through the expression of their will by
democratic means and through constitutional processes."569 Thus, this
status option, because it is not a final option, should be questioned.
Finally, the United Nations should be involved in each territory's
status referenda so as to ensure free and open elections. The United
Nations may also serve to check undue influence by any group,
567.
568.
29, U.N.
569.

Roman, supra note 8, at 28.
See G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, 948th plen. mtg. at
Doc. Af4684 (1960).
Id.
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including the United States. This issue should not be considered a
domestic one. It is an international one and the United Nations should
have binding authority, but no one country's veto power, such as that
held in the security council, should be recognized.
In addition to the procedural steps to change, there should be
substantive changes. As Professor Malavet suggests with respect to
Puerto Rico's future, "it would be illegitimate to require the Puerto
Ricans to make a decision [concerning their status] in the context of
continued colonial rule. " 570 Thus, although earlier works of the lead
author avoided the political status question, the status question is also
the colonial.
As such, the commonwealth, freely associated, or other status
options that retain the hallmarks of colonialism through Unites States
influence over the territories must be terminated. While proposals
such as bilateral compacts sound appealing, 571 the history of the United
States relationship with the post-World War II acquisitions of
Micronesia, Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Mariana
Islands demonstrates that such compacts do not ensure autonomy.
Statehood is considered a means to attain self-determination. Yet
statehood may be seen as the culmination of colonialism, particularly
wh~n the majority of the territorial people want to maintain their
identities as distinct people. Independence for these nations is the
option that is consistent with self-determination and maintains the
distinctiveness of these people. Independence is the just and
egalitarian option that neither the United States nor the island people
may choose.

vm.

CONCLUSION

Despite the press releases mentioned in the beginning of this Article,
as we all know, Al Gore did not win the presidential election. 572 While
that point was not news, what is newsworthy is that millions of United
States citizens and nationals who happen to live on the United States
island territories do not and have not ever had the right to decide this
country's or their own territory's future. They are disenfranchised yet
few see them that way. The hegemonic tools of citizenship,
international status, and economic dependency have well served the
United States' empire building. This Article exposes the similarities in
the plight of these people, many who believe themselves to be
570. Malavet, supra note 22, at 95.
571. Id. at 99.
572. Cf. JAKE TAPPER, DOWN & DIRTY: THE PLOT TO STEAL TIIE PRESIDENCY (2001)
(describing the controversy in Florida during the 2001 Presidential election).
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American, and it also examines the genius and evolution of American
colonialism. In an era when colonialism is deemed repugnant to
human dignity, perhaps this Article may be a step toward ending
United States colonialism, but more likely it is an effort to continue the
debate. 573

573.
Este artfculo es escrito con mucho respecto y carifio para mi pueblo. La patria
preciosa de mi pueblo se llama Borinquen. El lugar de donde vino mi bella cultura; una
cultura noble, de carifio, respeto y valor. Este hijo de jibaritos sencillos y de tafnos
bravos, suefia que un dfa vera su patria y pueblo libre. [This article is written with a
great deal of respect and kindness for the lead author's people. The country of his
people is called Borinquen. It is the land of his beautiful culture; a nobel culture filled
with kindness and valor. This son of peaceful farmers and brave indiginous warriors
dreams of the day his land is free.]
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